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ABSTRACT 
Title of Dissertation:  A study on the effectiveness of the ISM Code through a 
comparative analysis of ISM and PSC data 
Degree:     MSc 
 
This dissertation aims to examine the effectiveness of the ISM Code in the shipping 
industry through a comparative analysis of ISM audit and PSC inspection data. This 
paper focuses on the improvement mechanism of the ISM Code which, to an extent, 
can be an indicator to measure the effectiveness of the Code. The assumption is 
that if the ISM Code is working correctly, the ISM audit (PSC inspection) should 
have a positive impact on the following PSC inspection (ISM audit). On that basis, 
the paper analysed how the ISM audits and PSC inspections influenced each other, 
and how this influence changes in two separate time frames.  
 
The analysis revealed that the ISM audit showed a positive impact on overall 
aspects of the safety management system; on the other hand, the effects of the 
PSC have appeared in limited areas such as maintenance, and documentation 
where the ISM audit showed vulnerability. It also found that the effect of the ISM 
audit appeared after a longer period, while the impact of the PSC inspection was 
exhibited in the short term period.  
 
The result affirmed that the ISM Code has strengths in its continuous improvement 
which requires a systematic approach, whereas PSC is robust in addressing 
immediate problems through its police function. The paper identified a 
complementary relationship between the ISM Code and PSC inspection. It showed 
the possibility that the police power of the PSC can supplement the weakness of the 
ISM Code in the short term, and at the same time, the continuous improvement of 
the ISM Code can make the PSC inspection more effective.  
 
This dissertation found that the ISM Code is partially working. In order to address 
the improper functioning of the improvement mechanism relating to the PSC 
deficiencies, it was proposed that more attention be given to whether corrective 
actions were appropriately taken concerning previous PSC deficiencies. 
 
KEYWORDS: ISM, PSC, Effectiveness, improvement mechanism, police power 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
 Since commercial shipping appeared in human history, the shipping industry has 
been developing safety regulations under its own initiative to protect its property 
from marine casualties (Anderson, 2003a). The classification societies, for instance, 
were founded in the nineteenth century to ensure the seaworthiness of ships for 
insurance purposes, which contributed to considerable technical advances in ships. 
However, as seaborne trade grew and public concerns escalated due to constant 
catastrophic marine casualties, the flag States gained the incentive to introduce 
safety policies (Boisson, 1999).  
 
 By this means, various laws and rules of flag States formed traditions in shipping 
whereby ships are obliged to comply with those safety rules. Simultaneously, flag 
States took responsibility for ensuring the safety of the shipping fleets flying their 
flags. This was written into international Conventions under the legal term  
‘Genuine Link’1, requiring a flag State to exercise effective control and jurisdiction 
over vessels flying its flag (Ö zcayir, 2001).  
 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO), established based on the traditions 
of flag State responsibility as a specialized agency of the United Nations and, 
formed by the Member States, enacted the highest practicable international 
standards for safety, security of ships and pollution prevention. Ever since the 
establishment of the IMO, the organization has focused on technical issues to 
                                       
1
 The Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958, Art.91 of the UNCLOS 1982 
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improve the safety level of ships, which was ineffective in addressing the underlying 
factors causing marine accidents (Anderson, 2003a).  
 
 Research regarding a series of accidents2 in the second half of 1980s and 1990s 
identified the human element as a major contributing factor to accidents, which 
provoked a reassessment of IMO’s policies and incited a new systematic approach 
toward maritime safety. In international efforts to eliminate human errors leading to 
shipping casualties, spearheaded by the UK, the ISM Code was developed. The 
ISM Code became mandatory through its incorporation in the SOLAS Convention 
1974 as Chapter IX at the 2nd session of the SOLAS Conference on 24 May 1994. 
 
The principle objectives of the ISM Code are to ensure safety and pollution 
prevention concerning ship operations. The Code, unlike prescriptive regulations, 
has not clearly stated specific technical requirements for ship structure, equipment, 
and operational aspects. Instead, it sets goal based mandates, requiring shipping 
companies to develop and implement their own safety management systems based 
on their individual circumstances. This flexibility, designed to apply the ISM Code to 
all types of ships, provides the shipping industry with room for further development 
in terms of safety management but also demands a matured safety management by 
the industry. 
 
The ISM Code requires shipping companies to establish Safety Management 
Systems (SMS) which allows verification of the implementation status of various 
sets of international instruments. Shipping companies can maintain the compliance 
with internationally endorsed rules by providing SMS, which should be regularly 
verified by the flag State or Recognized Organization. The SMS ranges from 
company policies on safety and pollution prevention to procedures for management 
reviews, which implies that the management of shipping and shipboard work 
procedures fall into the areas required to comply with international rules. 
 
                                       
2 Herald of free enterprise (1987), Dona Paz (1987), Exxon Valdez (1989), Scandinavian Star (1990), 
Agip Abruzzo (1991), Haven (1991), Salem Express (1991), Aegean Sea (1992), Braer (1993), 
Estonia (1994), Sea Empress (1996) 
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In fact, regulating the operational procedure was not a completely new concept for 
the shipping industry. Operational requirements, developed throughout history, have 
been incorporated into various current rules. For instance, in the middle ages, the 
large Mediterranean ports enacted stringent regulations to prevent overloading, 
which passed down to the Merchant Shipping Act of 1876, known as the ‘Plimsol 
Act,’ in the UK (Boisson, 1999) 
 
Nevertheless, the value of the ISM Code should be distinguished from the existing 
operational requirements because it expanded the areas to be regulated to shore 
management and provided improvement mechanisms for the management system, 
whereas specific operational requirements are merely focused on specific shipboard 
activity and take a fragmentary approach. This made the ISM Code one of the most 
comprehensive and effective tools for ensuring the implementation of flag State 
obligations together with Port State Control (PSC). 
 
Provided the flag State is a primary actor in the safety of shipping, port State might 
be called a supporter. The first port State jurisdiction of control over foreign vessels 
was presented in the SOLAS Convention in 1914, failing to come into force due to 
World War I. The authority and legal capacity of the port State has been discussed 
to establish the limits in protecting the interests of port States in various international 
Conventions3. As the enforcement came into practice in many countries, the PSC 
regime was widely accepted by the maritime industry as a ‘Safety Net’ to monitor the 
safety of shipping and environmental protection (Ö zcayir, 2001).  
 
 The deficiencies identified by PSC inspections do not only imply the defective 
condition of the ship. The results of the inspections directly present the safety 
condition of the particular ship, and also the degree of implementation of flag State 
obligations if they are extended to the whole fleet of the flag State. The rates of 
detention are commonly utilized in the assessment of the safety level of the flag 
                                       
3 SOLAS 74, reg. Ⅰ/19, reg. IX/6 and reg. XI/4; Load Line Convention 1966, Art.21; MARPOL 73/78, 
Arts.5 and 6, reg.8A of Annex I, reg.15 of Annex II, reg.8 of Annex III and reg.8 of Annex V; STCW 78, 
Art. X and reg. I/4; Tonnage Convention 1969, Art.12 
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State by regional PSC MoUs4. And the results of PSC inspections have been 
acknowledged by the way of explicit index as evaluating the performance of the ISM 
Code since the deficiencies can be said to be the outcome of improper 
implementation of the Code.  
 
Along with the indicative functions for assessing the performance of the Code, 
more importantly, PSC inspections substantially impact the safety management 
systems of ships. If the SMS works properly, the deficiencies identified during PSC 
inspections should be processed and thereby remedial action should be taken 
according to the improvement mechanisms of the SMS. In this regard, Anderson 
(1998) argued that the implementation of the ISM Code depends on how the SMS is 
addressed and monitored by PSC inspection.  
 
It might be possible to observe, in this respect, how the ISM Code works if we 
measure the PSC performance after the ISM audit and, equally, evaluating the 
performance of an ISM audit following PSC inspection would help us to determine 
whether or not the ISM Code works. Besides, it would be possible to witness how 
the good performers in ISM audits would perform at the following PSC inspection, 
which would be practical information for the shipping industry to appreciate the 
benefit of maintaining fair safety management systems in its companies. 
 
1.2 Objectives 
 
This dissertation started asking whether the ISM Code, and the PSC regime 
positively impact the safety of ships as much previous literature investigated. Are the 
audit and PSC inspections contributing to the safety of ship operations? If so, can 
we demonstrate the same by comparing ISM audit records and PSC inspection 
records to each other? This paper, based on this idea, will research the 
effectiveness of the ISM Code by examining how the ISM audit impacts the PSC 
inspection and vice versa. The study will focus on the data analysis of relations 
                                       
4 Memorandum of Understanding 
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between performances in ISM audits and PSC inspections. Based on the analysis, it 
will attempt to interpret the analysis results and seek further improvements to ensure 
the effective implementation of both regimes.  
 
It is hoped that the study will provide the shipping industry and Administrators with 
better awareness of the ISM Code and PSC regime, and hopefully it would be taken 
into account when maritime safety policies are established. Therefore, this 
dissertation: 
 
 Reviews the pre-literature and methodologies related to examinations of the 
efficiency of the ISM Code and Port State Control. 
 Studies the historical background, features and legal implications of the ISM 
Code and Port State Control. 
 Analyzes the data of ISM audits and PSC inspection results for sampled 
ships flying the Korean flag for a period of 2.5 years from the 2nd half of 
2013 to 2015.  
 Tries to interpret the dataset and identify the statistical tendency from it. 
 Discusses the implication of the analysis and identifies areas to be 
addressed for the further improvements. 
 
1.3 Scope of the study 
 
To achieve the objectives of the research, this dissertation consists of 7 Chapters. 
Chapter 1 introduces the background, objectives and the scope of the study which 
allows a better understanding of the purpose of the dissertation.  
 
A literature review in connection with the impact and effectiveness of the ISM Code 
will be undertaken in Chapter 2 to appreciate which methodologies have been 
applied to seek the results, and how the shipping industry and academia have 
perceived the impact of the ISM Code. Equally, the paper will look into the literature 
relating to the impact and benefit on the safety of shipping, legal jurisdiction, 
targeting and harmonization, and influence of PSC on the shipping industry.  
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In Chapter 3, the background of the ISM Code as an international regulation will be 
introduced. The legal implications and relations with flag State obligations and the 
ISM Code will be studied through international Conventions and literature. In 
addition, the way in which the ISM Code is implemented in Korea will be presented. 
It will be concluded with that the main characteristics, the legal implications and 
traits of the ISM Code to assist in understanding the analysis and discussion of the 
data in Chapter 6.  
 
In the way of the previous Chapter, Chapter 4 will review the background and the 
emerging PSC MoUs around the world. The legal implication and current roles of 
PSCs in relation to maritime safety and pollution prevention will be presented by 
looking into the relevant Conventions and regional PSC agreements. Further, the 
PSC practice in the Tokyo-MoU will be briefly addressed, and the implications of 
PSC regimes on the maritime industry will be summarized. 
 
Chapter 5 will describe the hypothesis of the dissertation and methodology. The 
expected results, the analysis will be addressed in detail. The method of data 
analysis including data sources, time frame, coding method, and data classification 
principles applied will be explained.  
 
As a core part of the writing, the data analysis results will be given in Chapter 6. 
The outcomes of the study will show how the ISM Code impacts subsequent PSC 
inspections with the passage of the time, and the same manner of analysis to 
measure the impact of PSC inspections will be carried out. Furthermore, based on 
the statistical analysis, the outcomes will be interpreted and discussed, by which, 
the paper will demonstrate the hypothesis and identify potential areas for ensuring 
the effective implementation of the ISM Code and PSC inspection.   
 
Finally, Chapter 7 will recap and summarize the findings. It concludes with the 
effectiveness of the ISM Code to the shipping industry and how the PSC regime 
supports better implementation of the ISM Code and suggests areas for further 
study.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 The International Safety Management Code 
 
 It would be significant work for administrators to evaluate the implementation 
condition of a new policy, apart from appropriateness, after a certain period has 
lapsed. In the maritime domain, for instance, if a new regulation for certain 
equipment on board is adopted, it might be easy to verify it through the established 
ship survey system. But, if the new policy is related to an intangible requirement, for 
instance, the ISM Code, it would be challenging to verify its efficacy. It is virtually 
impossible to verify overall compliance with the Code in a limited time, no matter 
how well trained and experienced the auditor.  
 
Some might say the relevant documents, such as Document of Compliance (DOC) 
or Safety Management Certificate (SMC), indicate that the Code is working. 
Nevertheless, they would not be sufficient to prove that the ISM Code had been 
internalized and is working in the shipping companies and ships as intended. It is 
not surprising that some argue that the SMC has become a mere license for ship 
operations (Lloyds list, 2003). However, much of the literature confirms that the ISM 
Code has, to some extent, had positive impacts on the shipping industry despite 
associated problems, which hinder the effective implementation of the Code.  
 
 The literature regarding the ISM Code has focused primarily on the impact and 
effectiveness of the Code on the shipping industry, along with the challenges 
associated with its proper implementation. At the early stages of the first Phase of 
the implementation of the ISM Code, researchers showed interest in the readiness 
of the industry and attempted to identify the key elements to assist the shipping 
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industry in the implementation of the Code. Chauvel (1997) compared the ISM Code 
and the quality management system; ISO 9002. Chauvel specified that the Code is 
established “based on a structural and controlled approach similar to ISO 9000 
standard relating to the quality control system”. 
 
Anderson (1998) studied the potential impact on the shipping industry from a legal 
perspective and practical aspects of the Code. The paper raised key issues related 
to the ISM Code; the actors of the Code, limitation of liability, insurance implications, 
and potential effects of the role of the designated person. Anderson concluded that 
the success of the Code and impact on the company depends on how it is 
developed and implemented in practice. Rodriguez & Hubbard (1999) also stressed 
the legal implications of the introduction of the ISM Code, studying relations with 
various regional laws and charter parties of insurance as a “New level of uniformity." 
The authors claimed that the SMS would be significant evidence when an accident 
occurs, for government investigators, underwriters, and courts, regarding how the 
company had a positive approach as to safety as well as a useful management tool 
for prudent ship owners. 
 
After the introduction of the ISM Code, interest shifted to the impact of the new 
Code. Many studies showed that the ISM Code has a positive impact, and has 
contributed to the enhancement of the safety of ships and protection of the 
environment. IMO (2005) confirmed that the ISM Code is heading in a positive 
direction through a report5, submitted at the 81st session of the Maritime Safety 
Committee (MSC), the first work on evaluating the effectiveness of the Code in 2005. 
The expert group, established by IMO, concluded that the “overwhelming majority of 
responses were supportive of the ISM Code” and “the ISM Code is embraced as a 
positive step toward efficiency through a safety culture, tangible positive benefits are 
evident”.  
 
                                       
5 Assessment of the impact and effectiveness of implementation of the ISM Code, MSC 81/17/1, 
21 December 2005 
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The positive impacts of the ISM Code were proved by way of financial benefits as 
well. New Swedish club (2001) demonstrated the beneficial impacts of the ISM 
Code through statistical data analysis of claims. The study found that the hull claims 
showed a clear downward trend, which made the club conclude that the investment 
in the ISM Code had been very worthwhile and effective implementation of ISM 
Code has a beneficial influence on the company. The club also found that 
respondents became more positive to the ISM Code as time lapsed (New Swedish 
Club, 2001).  
 
Anderson (2003a) described in the published research, “Cracking the Code”, that 
the shipping industry also recognized the benefit of the Code since incidents 
declined by virtue of the Code’s implementation in general. Anderson also surveyed 
in his thesis that the majority of the Masters, ship operators, and other stake holders 
agree that the number of incidents has decreased since phase one of the ISM Code 
(Anderson, 2003b) 
 
According to the MOMAF (2006), it was noted that Korean seafarers were also 
aware of the function of the ISM Code in enhancing ship safety. One hundred and 
nineteen seafarers responding to a survey gave a rating of 3.8 out of 5.0 points to 
the question of whether the ISM Code contributes to safe ship operation. 
Unexpectedly, the report underlined that the rating increased with the responder’s 
maritime experience, contradicting the assumption that resistance to the ISM Code 
comes primarily from mature seafarers. In contrast, relating to the role of the ISM 
Code in the prevention of marine accidents, workers in the Korean shipping industry 
held the view that its impact was minimal. 
 
Research presented in 2010 revealed that 30.7% of 417 respondents agreed that 
the Code contributed clearly to the decrease in accidents, but 47.2% agreed only 
partly (MLTM, 2010). The report concluded that the ISM Code had not, so far, 
exhibited clear effects on preventing accidents in the Republic of Korea even though 
the majority of individuals in the industry recognized the positive impact of the Code. 
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The effectiveness and impact might be two sides of the same coin because the 
positive impact would not appear if the ISM Code was not working effectively. In this 
paper, in relation to the ISM Code, the impact is understood as the consequences of 
the Code, while the effectiveness is understood as whether or not the Code is 
working as it is designed to. The effectiveness of the Code has significant concerns 
for academia as well. Most of the research recognizes that the Code is working to 
some degree in practical ship operations, but there are still challenges facing the 
achievement of its goals.  
 
Anderson (2003) acknowledged that the Code was partly working and achieving its 
objectives of the Code. The research revealed the interesting result that perceptions 
relating to the ISM Code vary with the seafarers’ nationality. Anderson suggested 
the necessity of taking cultural background into consideration when undertaking a 
qualitative survey. The effectiveness of the Code was proved in the Finnish shipping 
industry. Lappalainen et al. (2012) evaluated a Finnish shipping company to 
determine the strengths and weaknesses of the policy instrument in the 
implementation of the Code. The paper determined that the main objective of the 
ISM Code had been achieved, which allowed the improvement of the safety level in 
the Finnish company.  
 
A Statistical approach has attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of the ISM Code. 
Mejia (2005) measured its effectiveness by contrasting the deficiency rate and 
detention rate of ships on which ISM phase 1 and 2 have been applied and 
exempted vessel, using the PSC data, collected from Swedish vessels, Swedish 
Maritime Administration, and publications of regional PSC MoU. According to Mejia, 
PSC inspection results of foreign ships in Swedish ports showed statistically 
meaningful drops in the number of deficiencies per inspection, and Swedish vessels 
with accelerated implementation of the ISM Code also exhibited significantly better 
performances than others.  
 
The study found that regional PSC Statistics also showed an overall positive effect. 
The paper cautiously concluded that the ISM Code has positive potential for the 
safety of ships while admitting the limitations of the PSC inspection regime and 
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restricted representativeness. The study validated the possible usefulness of using 
PSC inspection Statistics in assessing the effectiveness of the ISM Code.  
 
Kokotos (2012) conducted a study using a statistical approach through analyzing 
investigation reports by the Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG) of accidents which 
occurred in the restricted waters6 over the period of 1995-2011. The research 
identified significant reductions in the human errors, leading to accidents. The 
results do not necessarily represent a cause and effect relationship between the 
reduction in accidents attributed to human error and impacts of the ISM Code. But, 
bearing in mind that one of the purposes of the ISM Code is to eliminate human 
error in shipping, the study confirmed that the introduction of the ISM Code proved 
to be effective for the enhancement of safety in the shipping industry.  
 
Considerable research has contributed to the identification of challenges arising 
during the implementation of the ISM Code. A number of studies claimed that too 
much paperwork demotivated the seafarers’ involvement in the safety management 
system. The typical off-the-shelf safety management system in the shipping 
company does not help safety management and seafarers are complaining about 
increased paperwork, including vetting inspection, and PSC (Nautical Institute, 
2004). Such issues can cause seafarers to lose their primary purpose for working on 
board (Anderson, 2003a). 
 
According to IMO (2005), the Expert Group also recognized the burdens of 
paperwork on board. The group recommended reducing administrative process and 
using electronic technology to reduce the paper workload for further efficient 
implementation. Lappalainen et al. (2012) also pointed out that bureaucracy was a 
significant problem for the ISM Code and that it acted as a barrier to the flexible 
development of the safety management practice of the company.  
 
Hahne (2000) tried to find obstacles in the organizational aspect such as 
organizational structure and safety policy, and qualification of the personnel. Hahne 
                                       
6 Ports, Canals, Straits, Anchorages, Coastal waters, etc 
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determined that the attitudes and perceptions of personnel involved are the most 
crucial factor for the success of the ISM Code. The lack of safety culture such as no-
blame, in the shipping company, has constantly been pointed out. Seafarers are still 
reluctant to report hazardous occurrences for fear of being blamed for the mistake, 
which undermines the continuous improvement of the SMS (Lappalainen et al., 
2012; Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009; Sagen, 1999).  
 
Anderson (2003) stressed the importance of motivating the individuals involved in 
the implementation of the Code, which can arise only within the concept of the 
culture. Anderson emphasized the significance of the safety culture by citing an 
interview that “the success of the SMS depends on the dissemination level of the 
safety culture on shipping company and the ship” (Anderson, 2003b). 
 
Another key organizational factor affecting ineffective implementation of the Code 
is poor support of personnel and resources by the company. Bhattacharya (2012) 
found a significant disparity in the safety management level between two different 
tanker organizations whereby there was a lack of seafarer participation in the safety 
management of one company. The research concluded that the reason for the low 
participation was caused by poor employment conditions, lack of organizational 
supports and low-trust relationship with managers. The paper also affirmed the lack 
of preconditions to achieve effective safety management in the shore-based 
workplace.  
 
Anderson (2003) also pointed out that insufficient company support relating to 
resources, including physical, human resources, and training, causes unsatisfactory 
implementation of the Code. Possibly, passive involvement in the SMS of seafarers 
who belong to scrupulous companies are an expected response, but one which 
ultimately has an adverse impact on the ISM Code.  
 
The lack of interpretation has also been raised as one of the problems impeding 
the successful implementation of the Code. Owing to the nature of the ISM Code, 
the flexibility gives potential to the company to develop its customized skills. 
However, this has brought about another issue. The researcher introduced the 
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testimony of a person involved, which stated that the auditors or Administrators had 
different interpretations of the same defect due to lack of uniform interpretation and 
the guidelines of the ISM Code. The shipping industry has suffered from confusion 
due to vague interpretations of the requirements of the Code and it is resulting in 
inconsistent implementation. Particularly, when auditing, the auditors tend to rely on 
personal skills and experience. Some interviewees in the maritime industry 
suggested that the Administration should develop its auditing practice. (Anderson, 
2003; Lappalainen et al., 2012; Sagen, 1999). 
 
Batalden & Sydnes (2014) tried to examine how the underlying causal factors in 
marine accidents are allocated in the functional requirement of the ISM Code related 
to human and organizational factors. They revealed the challenges of ineffective 
implementation of the Code wherein the primary challenge lies in section 7 of the 
ISM Code; “development of plans for shipboard operations.” The poor management 
of the ‘resources and personnel’ (section 6), ‘master’s responsibility and authority’ 
(section 5), and ‘company verification, review and evaluation’ (section 12) were also 
noted as significant shortcomings in the implementation of the ISM Code.  
 
 According to the previous literature regarding the ISM Code, in summary, it was 
learned that the ISM Code has settled down in the shipping industry, and is showing 
positive impacts therein as evidenced by the perceptions of personnel involved, and 
reductions of marine accidents. However, the studies measuring the effectiveness of 
the Code seemingly need to be more empirical to convince the shipping industry 
that the ISM Code is beneficial to them in a practical way, and to make shipping 
companies aware of obstacles to its proper implementation. Such studies could 
provide the shipping industry with practical assistance to overcome these problems. 
 
2.2 Port State Control 
 
PSC has been performing as a “safety net of last resort” for the shipping industry 
against improper exercise of flag State responsibility since it was established 
(Ö zcayir, 2008). There is considerable literature regarding the impact and the 
effective exercise of PSC inspection. Since the existing PSC literature uses the 
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terms impact together with effectiveness in a general sense, the terms will not be 
distinguished in this section. PSC inspection has some inherent penalizing functions 
for substandard ships, so the impacts of PSC inspections can be found in many 
aspects.  
 
If we look at the direct impact of the PSC, it might be a decrease in substandard 
ships and marine accidents or vessel-source pollution. Hare (1997) studied the 
overall PSC procedures, practice and domestic arrangement of several countries. 
Although there were no explicit changes in the number of fatalities of seafarers and 
total losses of vessels at that time, Hare concluded that PSC would be the most 
effective measure in removing substandard ships and unscrupulous ship owners 
from the industry based on efforts being undertaken by various entities.  
 
However, Anderson (2002) applied a long term perspective, and proved 35 percent 
cuts in the number of total losses since the 1970s, using the data taken from Lloyd’s 
Register of Shipping, as evidence of positive impact of the PSC. It was assessed 
that the rate of total loss of merchant ships has been declining by four percent every 
year since PSC was introduced.  
 
Cariou et al. (2008) conducted an investigation into the effect of an PSC inspection 
on the following inspection in the number of deficiencies. The study found that the 
percentage of vessels that had fewer deficiencies than in the previous inspection 
was 63% for all age categories. The authors concluded that this demonstrated the 
strong impact of PSC inspection on the safety condition of particular vessels.  
 
The same research was conducted again using PSC data in the Indian Ocean MoU. 
The analysis demonstrated that more than 60% of the vessels had fewer 
deficiencies in the following inspections (Mejia, Cariou, & Wolff, 2010). The study 
suggested that PSC inspection resulted in positive effects on successive PSC 
inspections, although to different extent, depending on the age of the vessels. 
 
Regarding the preventive effect on pollution, Bang (2008) carried out research on 
the impact of PSC on vessel-source pollution using data from regional PSC MoUs 
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and the USCG. Bang found that regarding breaches under MARPOL 73/78, there 
was 60% reduction of oil pollutions during the 1980s in the US, and some 
deficiencies related to MARPOL Annex I, and Annex II have declined in the Paris 
MoU. The paper also showed that detention and deficiency rates were decreasing in 
the Paris MoU and Tokyo MoU.  
 
The paper concluded that it was too early to assess the practical effects; however, 
it could be a positive signal that the substandard ships are being controlled 
appropriately by the PSC in general. In other words, the PSC regime has achieved 
its purpose, by virtue of rigorous inspections, of preventing vessel-source pollution, 
particularly from substandard vessels. 
 
 Knapp et al. (2011) carried out research to measure the monetary profits of PSC. 
The study suggested that estimated cost savings on average, calculated based on 
the total insured value, was in the range of USD 74,000 to 192,800 due to risk 
reduction of total loss. It was also found that the cost savings went up as the vessels 
aged except for passenger vessels, and the vessels in the group of undefined flags 
and unknown classification society benefit from higher cost savings. Bearing in mind 
that maintaining safety requires investment, it can be said that the shipping industry 
benefits from port States taking certain parts of the costs.  
 
The impact of PSC does not remain in safety itself, but changes the business 
ecosystem as well. The PSC regime has been intensifying every year worldwide, 
driving unscrupulous ship owners to change their ships’ flag and classification 
society. It was confirmed that PSC inspection does not remain in monitoring the 
safety performance of vessels, but influences the probability of flag-out and transfer 
of classification society (Cariou & Wolff, 2011).  
 
As the targeting system is enforced, vessels with poor performing flag State 
nationalities and classification societies are likely to undergo repetitive and 
intensified inspections in a shorter period, which causes flag-hopping and class-
hopping to avoid severe PSC inspections. Fan et al. (2014) found based on the 
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data7 that the inspection rate of the ship was the most dominant determinant to 
increase the probability of flag-out, while the size of the ship was a less significant 
factor. With regard to the classification society, vessels registered to members of the 
International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) changed flags less 
frequently than those registered in non-IACS member classification societies.  
 
In connection with the effective exercise of the PSC, research has been 
undertaken in various aspects. Bang (2008, 2013), mainly focused on anti-pollution 
aspects, and recommended the proliferation of regional cooperative initiatives for 
the exercise of port State Jurisdiction. It was also stressed that the port State should 
be able to receive reliable information in case of vessel-source pollution. In addition, 
suspension of certification of seafarers committing willful discharge of pollutants, 
uniform statistical data management by the various PSC MoUs and several 
targeting methods were suggested. For example, the PSC should target ships which 
are not using port reception facilities. Fan et al. (2014) suggested considering other 
possible measures such as monetary penalties for deficiencies, insisting that current 
detentions or deficiencies are not enough to achieve effective enforcement. 
 
 Concerning the targeting methodology, it has become one of the most interesting 
areas for Regional PSC MoUs how to effectively allocate the enforcement resources 
in targeting substandard ships from a cost and benefit point of view. The regional 
PSC MoUs have developed their targeting system to prioritize the vessels to be 
inspected, and academia has contributed in line with targeting issues by providing 
various studies.  
 
Degré (2007) carried out research to identify high-risk vessels on the basis of the 
concept of risk. The study took the probability of casualties and subsequent 
consequences into consideration, as a part of the work of the European project 
                                       
7 Data from Lloyd's Register, Port State Control inspection data from various Regional PSC MoUs, 
Annual Report from Economic Freedom of the World, BMCO’s Shipping Industry Flag State 
Performance, World Casualty Statistics from Lloyd’s Fairplay, and existing literature 
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MarNIS8 of the 6th Framework Program. The research suggested that the ship 
variables (type, size, age) be combined with the Paris MoU list of criteria in order to 
improve the efficacy of the targeting system. The following year, the author 
proposed a change to the targeting system, based on the worldwide casualty 
database platform, to an individual vessel based targeting system by using a 
multivariate approach taking into account the casualty records during a specified 
period (Degré, 2008). 
 
 Cariou et al. (2007) attempted to determine which relevant factors should be 
considered in targeting vessels. The paper found three main determining factors, 
which are the age of vessel at inspection, the type of vessel, and the flag of registry. 
The study revealed that the relationship between age of vessel and number of 
deficiencies varied by the type of vessel. Cariou et al. (2009) attempted to ascertain 
how to weigh the factors in selecting the vessels to be targeted. The research 
showed that the age of vessel was the primary contributory factor in its detention, 
followed by RO and place of the inspection. They also underlined that the weight of 
the individual factors is variable depending on the type of deficiencies, and the 
detention rate is also considerably affected by the inspecting authority, which calls 
for the necessity of harmonized inspection regimes in the regional PSC MoU. 
 
 As far as harmonized PSC inspection is concerned, a series of studies was carried 
out to look into the different probabilities of detention and different treatment of 
vessels across regional PSC MoUs (Knapp & Franses, 2006, 2008; Knapp & van de 
Velden, 2009). The studies pointed out that a ship subjected to too many repetitive 
inspections in a relatively short period would lose the benefit of inspection. It also 
turned out that the probability of the detention was affected by different levels of 
enforcement from one place to another, and also the personal background of 
inspectors, as demonstrated recently (Ravira & Piniella, 2016).  
 
On the other hand, the profile of vessels, such as size, flag, classification society or 
ship owner, was not necessarily significant. The researchers found that different 
                                       
8
 Maritime Navigation and Information Service 
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areas of interest in terms of inspection by the inspection regime exist. The finding 
indicates further room for improvement in the harmonization of the practical 
inspection procedure. It was proposed to facilitate the harmonization at two levels; 
IMO and regional level, which can be enhanced by uniform procedures, technical 
assistance using GISIS9, and unified deficiency coding system. 
 
 To be brief, the PSC regime has been contributing not only to the enhancement of 
the safety of the ship and prevention of maritime pollution but also to a sustainable 
shipping business. To ensure the effective exercise of the PSC regime, refined 
targeting methods and harmonized inspection procedures have been suggested. 
However, more attention should be paid to finding the way to create more synergy 
between the PSC regime and other influential maritime safety initiatives such as the 
ISM Code. 
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 Global Integrated Shipping Information System  
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3. INTERNATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT CODE 
 
3.1 The Herald of Free Enterprise 
 
 Major international Conventions have developed in the wake of historical marine 
accidents, for instance, the sinking of the Titanic gave birth to the SOLAS 
Convention. Likewise remarkable disaster that triggered international conversation 
on the management issue was the Herald of Free Enterprise. The Herald of Free 
Enterprise, a 7,951 G/T, Roll on/Roll off passenger and freight ferry built in 1980, 
registered at Dover, classed by Lloyd’s Register of shipping, engaged in the route 
between Dover and Zeebrugge, capsized on 6 March 1987, resulting in the loss of 
life of 193 passengers and crew. 
 
 The investigation report of the UK discovered that the Herald of Free Enterprise 
surprisingly sailed out with its bow door open, which allowed the quick ingress of 
water into the car deck, ending in rapid capsize. The faults causing the accident 
seemed to be errors of individuals who should have taken responsibility on board; 
however, the investigation report, more importantly, stressed the underlying faults 
contributing to the chain of errors from the shore-based management.  
 
To be precise, the investigators witnessed the collapse of the safety management 
system across the company. They concluded that the unreasonable errors on board 
which led to the disaster were consequences of the poor management of the 
company stating that “From top to bottom the body corporate was infected with the 
disease of sloppiness” (Department of Transport, 1987). As an aftermath of the 
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tragic incident, IMO Resolution A. 596(15) 10  which directed the IMO to move 
forward to establish the shipboard and shore based management procedure, which 
later became the ISM Code, was accepted on 19 November 1987 by member 
States (IMO, 1987). Without a doubt, the Herald of Free Enterprise, in this regard, 
was obviously a turning point in maritime safety regulations (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 
2013). 
 
3.2 New safety management approach of IMO instruments 
 
 The IMO has progressed, since 1959, from an international forum to discuss 
maritime regulations related to technical standards. Article 1(a) of the Inter-
governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO, the former organization of 
IMO) was "to provide machinery for cooperation among Governments”…… 
regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds…….” It evidently 
shows the innate characteristic of IMO as a technical body (IMO, n.d.). It must be, 
indeed, a reasonable approach considering the technologies relating to hardware of 
vessels that had rapidly developed at that time, providing considerable room to 
explore technical aspects.  
 
 In response to major marine casualties, IMO has developed new regulations and 
guidelines mostly leaning towards technical issues as shown in Table 1. It illustrates 
that the IMO’s response heavily relied on technical matters except for the STCW 
Convention (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2013). Despite the efforts of the IMO to 
prevent marine casualty, major incidents exploded during the 1980s and early 1990s, 
which gave alert to international society and made Administrators ask themselves 
what went wrong. 
 
 For instance, ‘The Human Element in Shipping Casualties’ in 1988, commissioned 
by UK Department of Transport, and ‘Analysis of Major Claims’ in 1991 issued by 
Thomas Miller P&I, suggested the clear message to the industry that marine 
casualties occur primarily due to human errors (Anderson, 2003a). The messages 
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 Safety of passenger Ro-Ro ferries 
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enabled IMO heed the human element issues, resulted in the paradigm shift of 
maritime administration policy at the international level, which is still ongoing (Mejia, 
2005). As one of the solutions to tackle the problems in conjunction with human 
error, the ISM Code was developed based on a holistic approach, providing a 
framework for safety management of shore and ship operations.  
 
Table 1 Selected accidents and the reactive follow-up in IMO 
Year Ship name Resulting measure/instrument 
In force 
Since 
1967 Torrey Canyon 
Intervention Convention, 1969 
Civil Liability Convention, 1969 
MARPOL Convention, 1973 
STCW Convention, 1978 
1975 
1975 
1983 
1984 
1976 Argo Merchant MARPOL Convention, Protocol of 1978 1983 
1987 
Herald of Free 
Enterprise 
ISM Code, 1994 1998 
1989 Exxon Valdez 
OPRC Convention, 1990 
MARPOL Convention, 1998 amendments 
1995 
1995 
1994 Estonia SAR Convention, 1998 amendments 2000 
1999 
2002 
Erika 
Prestige 
Res. 949(23) Guidelines on places of 
refuge for ship in need of assistance 
2003 
Note. From "Maritime human factors and IMO policy" by Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 
2013, Maritime Policy & Management, 40(3), p. 246. 
  
3.3 Flag State responsibility and the ISM Code 
 
 According to the Geneva Convention on the High Sea 195811, the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS)12, a “Genuine Link” between flag State 
                                       
11
 Article 5  
1. Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of 
ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose 
flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship; in 
particular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical 
and social matters over ships flying its flag. 
2. Each State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its flag documents to that 
effect 
12
 Article 91 Nationality of ships  
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and ship should exist. Herewith, the flag State should be in a position “to exercise 
effectively it jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters 
over the ships flying its flag”, which is a responsibility conferred on the flag State by 
Article 9413 of the UNCLOS (UN, 1982). 
 
 Article 94 of the UNCLOS imposes on the flag State responsibility for the safety at 
sea of ships flying its flag, based on the principle of “Genuine Link”. Inter alia, 
construction, maintenance and seaworthiness; manning, labor conditions and 
competence of crew; and prevention of collision and provided legal obligations to 
cope with national law and international treaties (Ö zcayir, 2001).  
 
 The duties of the flag State given by Article 94 of UNCLOS have been manifested 
through various Conventions, codes, and guidelines developed by the IMO. 
Although the ISM Code does not require specific technical or operating regulations 
for the safety of the ship, it provides tools to monitor the implementation conditions 
of safety and anti-pollution activities on shore and aboard in general. The ISM Code 
requires in the objectives that the safety management system should encompass 
compliances with the rules and regulations, codes, guidelines, and standards 
recommended by internationally accepted organizations14 (IMO, 1993). 
 
 Namely, the ISM Code has an umbrella function in the discharging of obligations of 
the flag State imposed by internationally accepted regulations. In addition, the ISM 
Code provides a mechanism to ensure compliances with the code by the audit and 
certification procedures in part B; Certification and Verification. Consequently, it can 
be said that the effective implementation of the ISM Code is crucial not only to the 
                                                                                                            
1. Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of 
ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose 
flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship.  
2. Every State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its flag documents to that 
effect. 
13
 Article 94 Duties of the flag State  
14
 “1.2.3 The safety-management system should ensure:  
.1 compliance with mandatory rules and regulations; and 
.2 that applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the Organization, 
Administrations, classification societies and maritime industry organizations are taken into 
account.”  
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performance of the single Code itself but also to fulfilling flag State’s responsibility to 
ensure the safety of ships and protection of the marine environment. 
 
3.4 Traits of the ISM Code 
 
 The ISM Code consists of part A and part B, and associated guidelines for proper 
implementation of the Code15 that was clarified by IMO Res. MSC. 353 (92)16. Part 
A mainly institutes implementation requirements for company and vessel, which is 
the main concern of this dissertation, while part B provides States with the 
administrative procedures to verify and issue certificates in harmonized practice.  
 
 The primary trait of the Code is company’s responsibility. The terms ‘company’ is 
the most repeated word throughout the text of the Code, an evidence highlighting 
the role of the company above all else. The preamble to the Code says that ‘the 
cornerstone of good safety management is the commitment from the top’, which 
announces that the commitment related to safety and environmental protection from 
the highest level of the company, reflected in section 2, has become a prerequisite 
in the international shipping business (IMO, 1993).  
 
The Code also stresses the safety management objective of the company in 1.2.2 
and identifies the authority and responsibility of key players of the Code; company, 
designated person, and Master in sections 2, 3, 5, and 6. Addressing and clarifying 
the roles of the key players, focusing primarily on the roles of the shore, can be 
fundamental and innovative measures in tackling the hazardous operations of the 
ship.  
 
                                       
15
 Guidelines for the operational implementation of the International Safety Management Code by 
Companies (MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.8), Guidance on the qualifications, training and experience 
necessary for undertaking the role of the designated person under the provisions of the International 
Safety Management Code (MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.6), Guidance on near-miss reporting (MSC-
MEPC.7/Circ.7), Guidelines for the operational implementation of the International Safety 
Management Code by Companies (MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.8). 
16
 Amendments to the International Management Code for the Safe operation of Ships and for 
Pollution (International Safety Management (ISM) Code), Adopted on 21 June 2013 
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No one can deny that the shipping industry has been affected by those 
requirements concerning the cultivation of a safety culture, even if it is not the case 
in reality to some extent (Heijari & Tapaninen, 2010). Taking into account the lesson 
learned from ‘the disease of sloppiness’ and the commercial pressures today that 
possibly cause poor company support and occurrence of accidents, the company’s 
responsibility is one of the critical elements supporting the proper work of the ISM 
Code (Withington, n.d.). 
  
 Secondly, flexibility should be another trait of the ISM Code. The preamble to the 
Code explains the virtue of flexibility by recognizing the different conditions in which 
companies exist. And the drafters of the Code tried to express this in broad terms by 
the general principles and objectives (IMO, 1993). In exchange for providing 
flexibility, the Code required the company to establish and implement the Safety 
Management System (SMS) including essential functional requirements as set out in 
1.4 of the Code. Different from other conventional regulations, this flexibility enables 
the company to keep its optimum operation procedures and room to develop beyond 
the regulations required by the Conventions. 
 
 The continuous training and customized work procedures for shipboard operations 
with check lists might be one of the most effective measures to address human error, 
which is caused by improper design, poor management on board or the ship 
management practice, resulting in major causes of the marine accidents (Etman & 
Halawa, 2007; Rodriguez & Hubbard, 1999; Rothblum et al., 2002; Squire, n.d.; 
Townsend, Mariner, & Tatman, 2006). In this regard, the functional requirements 
enabling customized SMS, supported by the flexibility concept, are one of the 
valuable elements in achieving the goal of the ISM Code. 
 
 Thirdly, the improvement mechanism may be the most important function of the 
ISM Code in terms of maintaining the practical and robust system, which is achieved 
by the Master’s review, reports and analysis of non-conformities, accidents and 
hazardous occurrence, and company’s verification set out in the 5.1.5, 9, and 12 of 
part A. The mechanism maintains the system in a dynamic condition in compliance 
with the ISM Code and free from deviations during the implementation of the SMS. 
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Certainly, the improvement mechanism ensures the company maintains its optimum 
SMS and prevents recurrence of unsafe operations in its vessels.  
 
In spite of the advantages of the mechanism, the improvement mechanism is still 
considered to be the utmost challenging area due to the ‘fear of blame culture’, and 
lack of understanding as to the philosophy of the Code (P. Anderson, 2003a; Berg, 
2013; Bhattacharya, 2009; Jouni Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009). The industry 
seemingly lost the benefit of learning opportunities instead of repeating mishaps. 
Furthermore, the mechanism could be an actual effective barometer of how the ISM 
Code works appropriately and how the ISM Code has a positive impact on the 
industry, which will be discussed in this dissertation in Chapter 6. Therefore, 
continuous improvement is the key component to providing the company with a self-
assessment and evolvement process.  
 
3.5 The ISM Code in the Republic of Korea 
 
 The Maritime Administration of Korea, Ministry of Maritime and Fisheries Affairs, 
promulgated “the directive on the implementation of the ISM Code” in May 1997 
following IMO Res. A. 741(18). The directive was enforced without penalties for 
those violated the regulations until the “Sea traffic safety Act” was revised, 
incorporating the directives in February 1999. The enforcement of the ISM Code, by 
type of vessels, followed the same timetable as SOLAS, which was accomplished 1 
July 2002.  
 
Peculiarly, the Maritime Administration decided to apply the ISM Code to domestic 
service vessels in 2002. The vessels carrying dangerous cargo on and above 500 
G/T were required to comply with regulations set out in the Act, which were 
simplified version of the ISM Code taking into account the domestic shipping 
environment. The domestic vessels subject to the simplified safety management 
system extended gradually in size and type of vessel. In 2003, it was applied to 
general cargo ships on and above 500 G/T, and it was completed by vessels 
carrying dangerous cargo above 100 G/T in July 2012. But domestic passenger 
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vessels were excluded from it because they had been developing a similar safety 
management system since the 1970s. 
 
 Coming back to the ISM Code, the Maritime Administration has delegated the 
authority of verification and certification to a classification society, exclusively to the 
Korean Register of Shipping, based on the Memorandum of Understanding on the 
delegation of statutory survey and certifications. But audits and certifications for 
domestic shipping are done by government inspectors in local offices, which keep 
auditing skills in the house of the Administration.  
 
The classification society should abide by the legal criteria to perform the statutory 
functions, such as number of service network, qualification and experience of the 
auditor, relevant directives for the audit and certification. Furthermore, the 
Administration undertakes the oversight programs on the status of statutory 
activities of the RO such as periodical reports of the performance in various aspects, 
annual audit, and special audit on RO when the Administration believes it to be 
needed.  
 
 The Administration may carry out a special audit on a ship and its company when 
the Administration judges that it is required. By special audit, an auditor from the 
Administration may withdraw the relevant certificate or request corrective actions as 
a practice of the regular audit procedures. The cases that apply to the special audit 
are as follows; 
 
 Upon the supervision over vessels detained by the PSC inspection, if the 
Administration judges that it is needed to ensure the ship’s safety or to 
prevent detention by PSC inspection in a foreign port.  
 Upon the supervision over vessels in order to check the implementation of 
safety management, if the Administration judges that it is needed to ensure 
safety and prevention of accident.  
 Upon a marine accident, if the Administration judges that it is needed to 
ensure the safety and prevention of further accident.  
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3.6 Implications and roles of the ISM Code 
 
 As it was reviewed in this Chapter, the ISM Code provides the company with the 
framework of safety and environmental protection. It ensures the facilitation of 
efficient monitoring of compliance with international rules that the vessel is subjected 
to. The flag State also benefits in the enforcement of its obligations since the 
Administrator can overview the performance of the fleet flying its flag through the 
audit and certification process.  
 
Seafarers also benefit from it even though some criticisms exist relating to 
bureaucracy and workload (Bhattacharya, 2009; Lappalainen et al., 2012; Nautical 
Institute, 2004). For instance, clear definition of responsibility between shore and 
ship has brought responsible management practice and changed the culture so that 
seafarers can report poor support from the company. There are some concerns that 
seafarers may lose maritime knowledge, expertise, and skills because of too much 
dependence on the SMS, but it is also true that uniform work procedures are helpful 
in reducing human errors. 
 
Owing to the enhanced safety of shipping, the insurance industry enjoys a 
decrease in marine accidents as well (New Swedish Club, 2001). However, if the 
company and seafarers do not exercise due diligent implementation of the Code, 
they take legal risks such as breaching the terms of insurance coverage and losing 
the right to limit financial liability when a marine accident occurs (Anderson, 1998). 
Consequently, it can be said that the ISM Code contributes to safer and cleaner 
shipping, simultaneously; legal responsibility will be imposed on unscrupulous ship 
owners. 
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4. PORT STATE CONTROL 
 
4.1 The Amoco Cadiz 
 
 On the morning of March 16, 1978, the crude oil tanker, Amoco Cadiz17, Liberian 
registered, owned by Amoco, carrying 1,604,500 barrels of crude oil from the Middle 
East, experienced a failure in its steering gear system. The crew discovered that the 
steering gear went wrong due to hydraulic oil leakage from broken bolts connecting 
oil pipes, and tried to repair it, but it was soon found to be beyond their capability.  
 
The Master of the Amoco Cadiz called the salvage tugboat, “PACIFIC”, but the 
negotiation between the Amoco Cadiz and Salvage Company to reach an 
agreement took some time, which made the ship drifting closer to the coastline by 
fierce winds and rough sea. In the end, the tug boat had not enough capacity to tow 
the tanker in severe weather conditions, resulting in the Amoco Cadiz grounding as 
the tug struggled. (Bauer et al., 1992; Spooner, 1978) 
 
 The aftermath of the grounding was catastrophic. The ship tore into two parts and 
its entire cargo oil and 4,000 tons of bunker fuel spilled into the sea. An oil slick 18 
miles wide, 80 miles long affected around 200 miles of the Brittany coastline of 
France. Beaches and 76 Breton communities were polluted. The oil spill resulted in 
the tremendous loss of marine life and destroyed the ecosystem to a great scale. It 
was reported that 20,000 diving birds died, and 9,000 tons of oysters were 
devastated (Bauer et al., 1992; ITOPF, n.d.). Since the Amoco Cadiz oil pollution 
                                       
17
 233,690 DWT, 334.02LX51.06B X19.8D, built in 1975, 44 crew members, 1 X 30,400 HP Diesel 
engine, Single screw 
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occurred one month after the adoption of the 78 protocol of the MARPOL 
Convention, the international society was even more traumatized by the accident.  
 
 The Amoco Cadiz drove IMO to elaborate the salvage rule, which later on 
developed into London Salvage Convention of 198918 and enforcement of Port 
State Control regime, which became IMO resolution A.466 (12)19 in 1981. Besides, 
the Amoco Cadiz became a driving force for West European countries to extend the 
‘Hague Memorandum’ in 1978, which was mainly concerned with living and working 
conditions required by the International Labor Organization Convention no. 14720, to 
include safety and environmental protection regulations of shipping. This issue was 
discussed at the Regional European Conference on Maritime Safety in 1980, and 
two years later, the Paris Memorandum of Understanding21 was signed by fourteen 
countries in Paris, which had suffered enormously from the Amoco Cadiz disaster 
(Hare, 1997; Paris MoU, n.d.-a) 
 
4.2 Emerging of PSC MoUs  
 
 Port State Control was not created in one day by the Paris MoU. Various types of 
controls existed throughout shipping history in European ports because the port 
States have recognized the need to control substandard ships for a long time. This 
belief was reflected in various international maritime Conventions so there were not 
barriers in the exercise of PSC at that time. Although some countries in Europe had 
port State inspections in their ports through their domestic laws, willingness to join 
international cooperation for harmonized control over substandard ships was not yet 
mature (Ö zcayir, 2008).  
 
The Amoco Cadiz changed that way of thinking. Members of the initial Paris MoU 
were convinced that they could be the next victims, and face political pressures after 
a similar disaster to what France had suffered. Nowadays, the Paris MoU consists of 
                                       
18
 entered into force 14 July 1996 
19
 Procedures for the Control of the Ships, IMO A. Res. 466 (12), adopted 19 November 1981 
20
 ILO Convention (No. 147) concerning Minimum Standards in Merchant Ships, (Geneva, 29 October 
1976) 
21
 The Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control 1982 (Paris MOU) 
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27 maritime Administrations, and undertakes more than 18,000 inspections with a 
mission that is “to eliminate the operation of sub-standard ships through a 
harmonized system of Port State Control” (Paris MoU, n.d.-b). The Paris MoU still 
exerts the strongest influence on the PSC inspection regime and international 
maritime industry. So, the awareness of the necessity of stringent control over 
foreign ships had developed a proliferation of regional agreements on PSC as well 
as IMO rules for ensuring uniform conduct of PSC inspections.  
 
 Following the pioneering Paris MoU, with the same aims, many regional PSC 
MoUs developed during the 1990s and early 2000s. The Latin American Agreement 
on Port State Control of vessels22 was adopted in 1992. The countries in the region 
of Asia-Pacific gathered in Tokyo and came to an agreement23 in 1993. Notably, the 
USCG joined as an observer and Chile, a member of de Viña del Mar, is also a 
member of the Tokyo MoU. In 1996, the Caribbean countries signed an agreement24 
in Barbados on February 9. The Mediterranean region25 also launched an MoU in 
1997, and the Indian Ocean region26 in 1998. The Abuja MoU27 was signed for the 
West and Central Africa region in 1999, Black Sea region28 in 2000 and the MoU in 
the Gulf region29 was signed in 2004. As a result, ten regional MoUs including the 
USCG around the world are organized and working for the elimination of 
substandard ships as a “safety net”. 
 
 The regional MoUs on PSC commonly contain, inter alia; 
 Structure (Organization) of the MoU. 
 Relevant international instruments. 
 Port State Control procedures; inspection, reporting, detention, etc. 
 Appeal process. 
 Amendment to the MoU. 
                                       
22
 The Acuerdo de Viña del Mar agreement on port state control 1992 
23
 The memorandum of understanding on port state control in the Asia-Pacific region 1993 
24
 The memorandum of understanding on port state control in the Caribbean region 1996 
25
 The memorandum of understanding on port state control in the Mediterranean region 1997 
26
 The memorandum of understanding on port state control for the Indian Ocean region 1998 
27
 The memorandum of understanding on port state control for the west and central Africa region 1999 
28
 The memorandum of understanding on port state control in the Black sea region 2000 
29
 Riyadh memorandum of understanding on port state control 2004 
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 Ship risk profile and Information system. 
 Administrative provisions. 
 
4.3 PSC in Conventions 
 
The legal ground for the jurisdiction of the port State can be found in UNCLOS, 
which is mostly related to the issue of prevention of pollution. Article. 211(3) deals 
with the legislative jurisdiction that empowers the State to establish its requirements 
for the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution of the marine environment by 
foreign vessels entered into its ports or territorial waters. However, the port Sate 
should not hamper the right of innocent passage in its own territorial waters (UN, 
1982).  
 
According to Article 211(3), the port State has the right to commence investigation 
into foreign vessels that are in one of its ports voluntarily by Article 218, and also the 
port State may institute proceedings in its local court on the illegal discharge of a 
pollutant. But the proceeding can be commenced only if the associated flag State 
has made a request or the State where the pollution occurred or a State damaged or 
otherwise threatened by it. In addition, according to Article 219, the port State 
should take appropriate actions to a vessel in its port if the ship has violated the 
international rules and standards in conjunction with the seaworthiness of vessels 
that may threaten damage to the marine environment. It stipulates the detention of 
vessels until the deficiencies have been removed and conditional release for sailing 
to the nearest port for permanent repairs.  
 
While UNCLOS provides the legal foundations of jurisdiction and broader features 
of the port State’s authority, IMO instruments contain precise provisions relating to 
the implementation of PSC inspections. In addition, while port State jurisdiction has 
primarily developed concerning prevention of pollution in UNCLOS, IMO instruments 
encompass not only pollution but also all safety-related issues such as ship design, 
equipment, manning, and competence of seafarers.  
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 PSC requirements in the IMO instruments originated from the 1914 SOLAS 
Convention which was created in response to the Titanic disaster. Even though the 
responsibility for safety of ships lies with the flag State, States recognized the needs 
to control foreign vessels at the early stages of international maritime Conventions, 
and these values are successfully reflected in the major Conventions of IMO. The 
IMO instruments which contain PSC provisions are; 
 
 SOLAS 74, reg. I/19, reg. IX/6 and reg. XI/4; 
 Load Line Convention 1966, Art. 21; 
 MARPOL 73/78, Art. 5, 6, reg. 8A of Annex I, reg. 15 of Annex II, reg. 8 of 
Annex III and reg. 8 of Annex V; 
 STCW 78, Art. X and reg. I/4; 
 Tonnage Convention 1969, Art. 12; 
 International Convention on the control of harmful anti-fouling on the ships, 
2001, Art. 11; 
 International Convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage, 1969, 1992 
protocol.  
 
The Maritime Labor Convention 2006 (MLC 2006), which is called one of the pillars 
of maritime safety, also provides a PSC regime in Article V paragraph 4 by which a 
port State may determine the compliance of a ship in its port with the requirements 
of the Convention. In order to facilitate harmonized and unified inspections of the 
PSC, IMO and ILO30  have developed a number of guidelines. IMO has been 
developing a variety of resolutions relating to PSC procedures and Res. A. 1052(27) 
was adopted31 in 2011, and there are guidelines for particular Conventions which 
are not incorporated in Res. A. 1052 (27), for instance, guidelines for PSC Ballast 
Water Management (BWM), Hong Kong Convention, Anti-fouling system. Each 
regional PSC MoU has also developed its inspection procedures on the basis of the 
IMO guidelines.  
 
                                       
30 Guidelines for PSC Officers on Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 
31
 IMO Res. A. 787(19), A.882(21) which revoked by Res. A. 1052(27)  
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The PSC inspection begins with checking the validity of vessel’s certificates on the 
grounds that flag State’s compliance with related Conventions should be verified. 
However; if PSCO finds clear grounds that the vessel does not meet the required 
regulations, the vessel is subjected to a detailed inspection. The ‘no more favorable 
treatment32’ principle is applied to all vessels including those registered to non-
parties to relevant Conventions which evidently enhances the PSC regime as an 
influential safeguard in international shipping.  
 
4.4 PSC practice in the Tokyo-MoU 
 
 The Tokyo MoU consists of 20 member States and one co-operating member. The 
Secretariat is based in Tokyo and ‘The Asia-Pacific Computerized Information 
System (APCIS)’ was established and coordinated by the Russian Federation. 
According to Article 1.4 of the MoU, Member States determine the goal of 
inspections annually by the percentage of individual foreign ships, and the 
committee monitors the Members’ activities. The substantial target of inspections by 
the committee is 80%, meanwhile, it was reported that Member States achieved 
around 70% in 2015 (Tokyo MoU, 1993, 2016). 
 
 The New Inspection Regime (NIR) was introduced in 2014 for selecting vessels to 
be inspected (Tokyo MoU, 2015). The NIR, risk profile based targeting, is 
encouraged for use by the Member States for prioritizing and determining inspection 
intervals other than in cases in which the port State was notified by another 
Authority or other party relating to safety issues. The qualification of PSCO and 
overall PSC procedures follow IMO Res. A. 1052(27). The MoU is undertaking a 
joint concentrated inspection campaign (CIC) with Paris MoU on different issues 
every year and publishes a report. 
 
 The MoU subdivided deficiencies into 566 codes by the nature of the deficiency 
which is nearly authentic to that of Paris MoU. One attracting attention is ISM-
related deficiency Code. Tokyo MoU classifies the deficiency codes by ISM Code 
                                       
32
 SOLAS Protocol 78, Article II(3); MARPOL 73/78, Article 5(4); STCW 78, Article X(5) 
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modules, for instance, 1501; Safety and environment policy, 15103; designated 
person(s). It will be useful if the data accumulates in the future in analyzing the ISM-
related performances (Tokyo MoU, 2013). The deficiency action Code is the same 
for other regional PSC MoUs.  
 
In 2015, member States of the Tokyo-MoU carried out 31,407 inspections, and 
1,153 vessels under 62 flags were detained, which is 3.67% of total inspections. The 
MoU announced the Black-grey-white list based on the performance level of the flag 
State over a three-year rolling period. The number of deficiencies per ship was 2.66 
and the top three major vulnerable areas were fire safety measures, the safety of 
navigation and life-saving appliances (Tokyo MoU, 2016). 
 
4.5 Implications and roles of PSC 
 
 Port State Control has become the most effective measure for ridding the world’s 
ports and oceans of substandard, unseaworthy and dangerous ships (Hare, 1997). 
Owing to the regional agreement, the ‘safety net’ has been tighter which allows the 
shipping industry to enjoy sound competition, while ship owners carrying on 
business with poor investment in safety are confronted with serious difficulties.  
 
Intensified PSC inspections motivate the shipping companies to maintain their fleet 
compliance, and it has become a substantial measure to keep passengers and 
seafarers safe even if some seafarers complain of the work burdens. Further, PSC 
inspection has contributed to promoting seafarers’ awareness related to safety and 
protection of the marine environment.  
 
 For flag States and classification societies, PSC inspection applies performance 
pressure in the implementation of responsibility imposed by international 
Conventions. The Black-grey-white list of flag States, published by regional MoUs, 
has become a powerful tool to foster competition among flag States with regard to 
their performance. Moreover, detention rates and RO responsible deficiencies in 
regional PSC statistics has become an indicator of the evaluating performance of 
classification societies.  
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The ‘safety net’ function of PSC has extended to the security issue and fair working 
conditions and welfare of seafarers. Hence, the PSC regime implies not only 
protecting port State interests but also serves a complementary function to the flag 
State’s responsibility to ensure the safety of the ship and protection of the 
environment. 
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5. HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Hypothesis 
 
 The ISM Code has great value in terms of providing a framework for a safety 
management system for the company. However, the positive effect of the ISM Code 
is not merely limited to the establishment of the SMS. The real virtue of the Code 
lies in the implementation. Among other things, the continuous improvement in the 
execution of the SMS should be highlighted since it permits enhancement of the 
safety management system and awareness and understanding of all personnel 
involved in SMS, and ultimately the prevention of marine accidents. 
 
 Identified non-conformity (NC) should be dealt with through various means of the 
improvement mechanism. This self-regulating safety management system helps 
the company to find what went wrong and eliminate the shortcomings of the SMS 
and improve the safety management system. Once the typical NCs due to 
improper safety management system are identified through near-miss or 
deficiencies during the PSC inspection, the company should investigate them and 
take necessary actions to prevent recurrence. This improvement mechanism keeps 
the SMS dynamic, which is invaluable to the company. 
 
In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the ISM Code, as reviewed in Chapter 2, 
a variety of means have been attempted. The number of marine accidents, 
insurance claims, PSC detention rates before and after the introduction of the ISM 
Code were compared, and also comprehensive interviews were carried out and 
analyzed. This paper, unlike previous studies, focused on the improvement 
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mechanism of the individual ship which can be an indicator to measure whether the 
ISM Code works correctly or not.  
 
Likewise, noting that the PSC inspection is the most effective and feasible indicator 
to measure the safety level of an individual vessel, it should be possible to examine 
the improvement mechanism of the ISM code by contrasting performance in an ISM 
audit and PSC inspection. If the improvement mechanism works well, we can say 
that the ISM Code works; on the other hand, if the mechanism does not work, the 
ISM Code may be ineffective. 
 
This dissertation aims to examine the effectiveness of the ISM Code, by using PSC 
inspection data and ISM audits of sampled vessels through tracking the history of 
two datasets. It will also explore how PSC inspection influences ISM audits. Thus, 
the hypothesis of this dissertation is; 
 
 If the ISM Code works, improvements should be seen following a PSC 
inspection or an ISM audit. Particularly, it would be represented by; 
 A good PSC performance following an ISM audit with bad performance. 
 A good performance in an ISM audit following a PSC inspection with 
bad performance. 
 Partial or no relationship between two events by the nature of the 
findings. 
 
 If the ISM Code does not work, improvement would not be seen - neither in 
the PSC inspections before or after the audit. It would be represented by; 
 A bad PSC performance following an ISM audit with bad performance. 
 A bad performance in an ISM audit following PSC inspection with bad 
performance. 
 Strong relationship between two events by the nature of the findings. 
 
The Figure 1 illustrates the hypothesis. 
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Figure 1 Hypothesis diagram 
 
This paper will not discuss the dotted lines which resulted in a bad performance at 
following ISM/PSC of good performance and ‘no or partial similarity’ after similarity 
analysis. This is because it is difficult to determine whether the ISM Code works or 
not solely by the number and limited data analysis, which needs to be elaborated 
case by case. These cases may be affected by several options such as the collapse 
of the SMS, false first ISM/PSC, and application of different measure at the following 
event (i.e. Concentrated Inspection Campaign; CIC), temporary or partial 
malfunctions of SMS and so on.  
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5.2 Datasets  
 
 Considering the accessibility of the data, Korean vessel data was used. Datasets, 
tabulated spreadsheets, relating to ISM audits and PSC inspection records were 
collected from the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) of the Republic of Korea, 
the author’s home country. PSC inspection data was restricted to the inspection 
records in the Tokyo MoU region. The ISM audit data was compiled by the Korean 
Register of Shipping (KR) which carries out ISM audits on behalf of MOF.  
 
The audit records are used for ships, not the company. And the Interim audit 
records were left out of the ISM audit data because interim audit does not cover all 
aspects of the ISM Code requirements so that it is difficult to determine the 
effectiveness of the ISM Code. Meanwhile, the deficiencies related to the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) and Maritime Labor 
Convention 2006 (MLC 2006) were excluded in the PSC data because ISPS and 
MLC 2006 have their management systems verified by the flag State. 
 
 The time frame of both datasets ranged from 2011 to 2015; a period of 5 years. 
During that time frame, Korean vessels underwent 6,972 PSC inspections with 
24,711 deficiencies, and 44 detentions in the Tokyo MoU region. In the meantime, 
1,402 ISM audits were undertaken with 2,743 minor NCs and 69 major NCs. Due to 
the enormous amount of data, it was decided to decrease the timeframe to between 
the 2nd half of 2013 and 2015 (2.5 years). To maintain the consistency of PSC data, 
the PSC inspection data used is from 2014 when NIR was introduced in the Tokyo 
MoU region, while the ISM data is from the 2nd half of 2013. Five hundred and 
ninety-two vessels were selected based on the condition that vessels have audit 
records since the 2nd half of 2013 as well as PSC inspection records after 1 January 
2014  
 
 To determine how the improvement mechanism works as time passes, namely, 
how an ISM audit impacts the following PSC inspection or how a PSC inspection 
influences the following ISM audit in the different time interval between two events, 
vessels with 0~180 days and 181~365 days between inspections and audits were 
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selected. Vessels were not duplicated. For example, if a ship had undergone an ISM 
audit on a certain day (T1) and the ship received a PSC inspection on a certain day 
after T1 (T2), the number of days between the two events will be T2 minus T133. In 
the 180 day interval category, 275 vessels with ISM audit records followed by PSC 
inspection records were selected, and similarly 174 vessels with PSC inspection 
records followed by ISM audit records were selected. In the same manner, 74 
vessels with ISM audits followed by PSC inspections and 32 vessels with PSC 
inspections followed by ISM audits were derived from datasets with 365 days apart.  
 
Only those vessels that did not undergo any ISM audit or PSC inspection between 
two events were chosen, which would allow us to observe the immediate impact on 
the following event. The reason why the data group in the 365 day interval category 
was smaller than the 180 day group can be explained by repetitive PSC inspections 
with indiscriminate targeting practice. Among the 592 vessels, there were 37 vessels 
intervals beyond 365 days or erroneous entries, which were omitted from the 
analysis. 
 
Table 2 Number of vessels with 180 days and 365 days intervals between two events 
Intervals ISM audit first 
PSC inspection 
first 
Total Remark 
0~180 Days 275 174 449 
37 vessels with 
invalid intervals 
181~365 Days 74 32 106 
Total 349 206 555 
 
Finally, the dataset was reduced to 50 vessels for four cases34 by using random 
sampling other than the case of PSC inspection followed by ISM audit with 365 day 
interval because there were only 32 applicable vessels available in that category. 
182 vessels, therefore, were employed in the analysis. 
                                       
33
 If ISM audit carried out in 1 January 2014 and then first PSC inspection after the audit was done in 
31 October 2014, there is 10 months (approximately 300 days) interval between two events. 
34
 ① ISM audit followed by PSC inspection with 180 days interval, ② PSC inspection followed by 
ISM audit with 180 days interval, ③ ISM audit followed by PSC inspection with 365 days interval, 
④ PSC inspection followed by ISM audit with 365 days interval 
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5.3 Methodology 
 
  This paper is a comparative analysis to determine whether or not the ISM Code 
works by analyzing the records of ISM audits and PSC inspections. Thus, the ISM 
audits and PSC inspection datasets for 182 vessels were combined into one dataset. 
The data of 182 vessels with corresponding records was taken from both datasets. 
The data from the PSC dataset includes the date of inspection, the number of 
deficiencies, and description of the deficiencies. The ISM audit records also 
contained the date of the audit, the number of NCs and description of the NCs.  
 
 During the analysis of the integrated datasets, the improvement in each vessel in 
response to the leading event was examined in the following event. This thesis 
classified the performance level into two groups for ISM audit and PSC inspection, 
good performer and bad performer, for simple conceptualization. Taking into 
account the average number of deficiencies per ship in the Tokyo MoU35 and NCs36 
from the audit of Korean vessels in the past five years, a vessel was categorized as 
a good performer if deficiencies or NCs were fewer than three, which means zero to 
two. Ships with three or more than three deficiencies or NCs were classified as the 
bad performers.    
 
 Good performers ≤ 2 findings (NCs or Def.) 
 Bad performers ≥ 3 findings (NCs or Def.) 
 
 In determining the areas of improvement, all NCs and deficiencies were classified 
according to the nature of the problems by the ISM modules ranging from safety and 
environmental policy in section 2 to company verification, review, and evaluation in 
section 12 as shown in Table 3. A careful examination determined which modules 
should be subject to NCs and deficiencies based on the ISM Code requirements 
                                       
35
 Deficiencies per inspection was 2.66 according to 2015 annual report of Tokyo MoU, (83,606 
deficiencies / 31,407 inspections)  
36
 During 2011 to 2015, 2,812 NCs were identified in 1,402 vessels in the ISM audits in Korean vessels, 
which means average number of NC per audit was 2.0 
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and relevant guidelines. This work provides an understanding of whether or not the 
ship undertook an improvement mechanism. It could be noted, for example, that the 
improvement mechanism of ship ‘A’ has worked if ship ‘A’ has no deficiency in 
‘emergency preparedness at PSC inspection, following an ISM audit with NCs 
relating to the ‘emergency preparedness.’  
 
In the course of classification, it was found that certain deficiencies and NCs could 
be subject to multiple ISM modules. If PSCO, for instance, identified a deficiency 
whereby the battery for starting a lifeboat engine was not charged, it was classified 
as ‘maintenance of the ship and equipment’ rather than ‘emergency preparedness’. 
The work of classification was carried out in a point of identifying the ultimate 
problematic issue which led to the deficiency.  
 
Table 3 ISM Code module 
Module Title 
2 Safety and environmental policy 
3 Company responsibility and authority 
4 Designated person(s) 
5 Master’s responsibility and authority 
6 Resource and personnel 
7 Shipboard operations 
8 Emergency preparedness 
9 
Reports and analysis of Non-Conformities, accidents and hazardous 
occurrences 
10 Maintenance of the ship and equipment 
11 Documentation 
12 Company verification, review and evaluation 
 
Furthermore, by using this codification, the similarity of the performance, and the 
nature of the problems will be analyzed to ensure the cause and effect relationship 
between ISM audit and PSC inspection of the individual ship. The similarity formula 
was developed with criteria of the level of similarity to provide a clear picture. If the 
percentage of the similarity is 50% or more than 50% according to the calculation, it 
might be said that a strong relationship exists with the previous audit or inspection. If 
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the percentage of similarity is between 1 and 49, it was categorized as partial 
similarity. 
 
Similarity (%) = [(Nnc-t1 or Ndef-t1 / Nt1) X (Ndef-t2 or Nnc-t2 / Nt2)] X 100 
 
 Nnc-t1 : Number of NC in the ISM audit followed by PSC inspection 
 Ndef-t1 : Number of deficiency in the PSC inspection followed by ISM audit 
 Nt1 : Total Number of deficiency or NC in the preceding event 
 Ndef-t2 : Number of deficiency in the PSC inspection following ISM audit 
 Nnc-t2 : Number of NC in the ISM audit following PSC inspection 
 Nt2 : Total Number of deficiency or NC in the following event 
 Criteria of Similarity : Strong - more than 50%, Partial - 1~49%, No – 0 
 
 In the case of N/A, since the similarity cannot be calculated if there were no 
findings in the leading event, it was classified as N/A. In contrast, if there were no 
findings in the following event, although the similarity cannot be calculated, it was 
categorized as no relationship since this paper is looking for the impact of the 
leading event.  
 
Table 4 Example of similarity calculations 
ISM NCs 
(PSC deficiencies) 
PSC deficiencies 
(ISM NCs) 
Calculation Result 
5, 6, 8, 8, 10, 10 10,10, 4 [ (2/6) X (2/3) ] X 100 = 22.2 % Partial 
9,10,12 10 [ (1/3) X 1 ] X 100 = 33.3% Partial 
10,10 10,11 [ 1 X (1/2) ] X 100 = 50% Strong 
8,9,10 11 - No 
- 10 - N/A 
7 - - No 
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6. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
6.1 Analysis of ISM audit followed by PSC inspection (ISM-first group) 
 
 6.1.1 Overview of ISM-first group. 
 
The NCs in the ISM audit and deficiencies in the following PSC inspection of each 
sampled ship (50) were contrasted by number to examine how the ISM audit 
impacted the following PSC inspection. Table 5 shows that the number of NCs when 
the interval was 180 days (hereinafter ‘short term’) was larger than when the interval 
was between 181 and 365 days (hereinafter ‘long term’), whereas the deficiencies in 
the PSC were reversed.  
 
Table 5 Total number of NCs and Def. in two timeframes 
Time NCs NCs/ship Def. Def./ship 
0~180 D 102 2.04 137 2.74 
181~365 D 81 1.62 161 3.22 
(Unit: pcs / ships) 
 
 
Figure 2 Number of NCs/Def. of ISM-first group 
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 6.1.2 Analysis by the number of findings 
 
Table 6 describes the number of ships contrasted by the number of NCs and 
deficiencies in the short term period. This table permits us to see how a particular 
ship with a certain number of NCs presented performances in the following PSC 
inspection. Namely, we can picture how the ISM audit impacts on the following PSC 
inspection and whether the improvement mechanism of the ISM Code works or not. 
Statistical analysis was derived as follows; 
 
 58% of Ships (29) had the same or higher number of NCs than the number 
of deficiencies in the following PSC inspection. 
 Nineteen ships had no deficiency and 56% of ships (28) had good 
performances in the following PSC inspection. 
 Among ships with good performance in the ISM audit (34), 70.6% of ships 
(24) maintained good performance in the PSC inspection, while 29.4% of 
ships (10) showed the same or worse performance in the PSC inspection. 
 Among ships with bad performances in the ISM audit (16), 25% of ships (4) 
showed improvement in the PSC inspection, while 75% of ships (12) 
showed the same or worse performance in the PSC inspection. 
 
Table 6 Number of ships compared by the number of NCs and Def. in short term 
Number 
of NCs 
Number of deficiencies 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total 
0 9 
 
1 1 
 
1 
      
12 
1 4 2 2 2 
     
1 
  
11 
2 4 1 1 1 
 
2 1 
 
1 
   
11 
3 
   
2 1 
 
1 1 
    
5 
4 2 1 
   
1 
    
1 
 
5 
5 
 
1 
 
1 
   
1 
   
1 4 
7 
      
1 
  
1 
  
2 
Total 19 5 4 7 1 4 3 2 1 2 1 1 50 
(unit: ships) 
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 In summary, 70.6% of ships among good performers in the ISM audit maintained 
their good performance in the following PSC inspections, while 29.4% of ships 
became worse. Meanwhile, 25% of ships among bad performers in the ISM audit 
exhibited improvement in their performance in the following PSC inspections, while 
75% of them showed the same or worse performance level.  
 
Therefore, it could be appreciated that the good performers in the ISM audit also 
show good performance in the PSC inspection, in general, which is normal. 
Simultaneously, the majority of bad performers maintain the same or worse 
performances category in the PSC inspection, which possibly indicates that the SMS 
does not work effectively on improvement. However, it was seen that good 
performers in the ISM Code have positive results on the following PSC inspection in 
the short term. 
 
Table 7 presents the number of ships contrasted by the number of NCs and 
deficiencies in the long term period. By analyzing the different timeframe, it would be 
possible to see how the ISM audit influences the following PSC inspection as time 
goes by. Statistical analysis was derived as follows; 
 
 56% of Ships (28) had the same or higher number of NCs than the number 
of deficiencies in the following PSC inspection. However, the total number 
of deficiencies was increased compared to the short term. 
 Eighteen ships had no deficiency and interestingly, identical with the short 
term, 56% of ships (28) had good performance in the following PSC 
inspection. 
 Among ships with good performance in the ISM audit (35), only 51.4 % of 
ships (18) maintained good performance in the following PSC inspection, 
while 48.6 % of ships (17) showed the worse performances in the following 
PSC inspection. 
 Among ships with bad performance in the ISM audit (15), 75% of ships (10) 
showed improvement in the PSC inspection, while 25 % of ships (5) showed 
same or worse performances in the PSC inspection. 
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Table 7 Number of ships compared by the number of NCs and Def. in long term 
Number   
of NCs 
Number of deficiencies 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 21 Total 
0 8 1 2 
 
1 4 
 
1  1 
 
1 
 
19 
1 1 1 1 
 
2 1 1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 10 
2 4 
  
1 
   
1  
    
6 
3 1 3 1 1 
   
1  
    
7 
4 3 
  
1 1 
   
 
    
5 
5 
  
1 
     
 
    
1 
6 
    
1 
   
 
    
1 
7 1 
       
 
    
1 
Total 18 5 5 3 5 5 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 50 
(unit: ships) 
 
According to Table 7, among good performers in the ISM audit, 51.4% of ships 
maintained their good performance in the following PSC inspection, while 48.6% of 
them got worse. In the meantime, 75% of ships among bad performers in the ISM 
audit improved their performance in the following PSC inspection, while 25% of 
them stayed at the same or worse performance level.  
 
It should be noted primarily that the bad performers make a remarkable 
improvement in the long term period, which is a different outcome from the short 
term period although the number of deficiencies was larger compared to the short 
term. It is also found that the increase in the number of deficiencies in the long term 
period was primarily concentrated in the good performers in the ISM audit, which 
resulted in the good performer’s degradation. Declined performances of good 
performers are a somewhat expected result. 
 
6.1.3 Similarity analysis 
 
It would not be sufficient to conclude that the decrease in the number of findings 
represents a positive impact of the ISM audit on the following PSC inspection. For 
example, if a ship that was given five NCs including two NCs relating to ‘Master’s 
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responsibility’ in the ISM audit received three deficiencies concerning ‘Master’s 
responsibility’ in the following PSC inspection, we could not simply say that the ship 
made an improvement due to the reduction of findings. Instead, it should be noted 
that the management system has not shown improvement because the ship 
revealed similar deficiencies in the following PSC inspection, which indicates that 
the improvement mechanism has not worked properly.  
 
The strong similarity, therefore, in findings between two events could be 
understood as evidence for the improper implementation of the ISM Code. If a ship 
has a strong similarity in the following event, it could be that the ship has not made 
an improvement; conversely, if a ship has no similarity, then it could mean that the 
ship has some improvement. Of course, there will be some different cases in which 
this cause and effect relationship does not work if both events have a different focus 
in terms of enforcement. However, the cause and effect relationship can be 
measured by the similarity analysis in general between ISM and PSC.  
 
The higher number of ‘no similarity’ or ‘partial similarities’ will show fewer 
repetitions of the same deficiencies in the PSC inspection. In order to examine the 
similarity, as mentioned in Chapter 5, the findings, NCs and deficiencies, were 
coded by the ISM module, which is the requirement same as the section of Part A of 
the ISM Code. The calculation formula is as follows; 
 
Similarity (%) = [(Nnc-t1 or Ndef-t1 / Nt1) X (Ndef-t2 or Nnc-t2 / Nt2)] X 100 
 Nnc-t1 : Number of NC in the ISM audit followed by PSC inspection 
 Ndef-t1 : Number of deficiency in the PSC inspection followed by ISM audit 
 Nt1 : Total Number of deficiency or NC in the preceding event 
 Ndef-t2 : Number of deficiency in the PSC inspection following ISM audit 
 Nnc-t2 : Number of NC in the ISM audit following PSC inspection 
 Nt2 : Total Number of deficiency or NC in the following event 
 Criteria of Similarity : Strong - more than 50%, Partial - 1~49%, No - 0 
 
Table 8 shows the results of the similarity analysis of the ISM-first group. Each 
number in the table indicates the number of ships with the corresponding similarity 
degree derived by the above calculation formula. N/A represents case in which a 
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ship with no NC has recorded more than one deficiency in the following PSC 
inspection.  
 
Table 8 Similarity comparison by the timeframe 
Degree No Part Strong N/A Total 
0~180D 24 9 14 3 50 
181~365D 23 11 5 11 50 
(unit: ships) 
 
It illustrates that fourteen ships in the short term have strong similarity, while there 
are five ships with strong similarity in the long term period. For the fourteen ships 
with strong similarity in the short term, it can be inferred that similar findings were 
repeated at the following PSC, which resulted in 75% of ships with same or worse 
performances. The number of ships with strong similarity in the long term is only five, 
which supports the explanation indirectly that 75% of ships improved their 
performance in the long term as discussed above.  
 
But it needs to be understood that the reduction in the number of ships with strong 
similarity does not necessarily mean that all ships in the long term made the 
improvement because of N/A. So it is necessary to examine the number of N/A in 
the long term, which is higher than in the short term. These ships with N/A are the 
cases, mentioned at the end of the 6.1.2, which contributed to the rise in 
deficiencies concentrated on the good performers in the ISM audit. It reveals that 
the similarity is not a robust indicator to measure improvement, but still it has a 
strong implication if other factors such as nature of the finding are evaluated 
accordingly.  
 
However, if the similarity is compared to the bad performers, there was only one 
bad performer with strong similarity in the long term while there were ten bad 
performers with strong similarity in the short term. Since the bad performers are 
ships with three or more NCs, the strong similarity directly means the repetition of 
the problems in the following event. Therefore, the conclusion could be made that 
the bad performers in the ISM audit improved with the passage of time. 
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Table 9 Similarity by the performance 
Similarity 
0~180D 181~365D 
Bad Good Total Bad Good Total 
No 2 22 24 8 15 23 
Part 4 5 9 6 5 11 
Strong 10 4 14 1 4 5 
N/A  3 3  11 11 
Total 16 34 50 15 35 50 
(unit: ships) 
 
If the similarity is compared with the nature of the findings to confirm the similarity 
analysis, it becomes apparent and gives a clearer picture. Table 10 and Table 11 
show a comparison between the similarity and NCs coded by the ISM module. It can 
be seen from Table 10 that, for instances of the strong similarity, all ships with 51 
NCs in the ISM audit, which means that ships with half of the total number of NCs, 
have the strong similarity with the deficiencies at the following PSC inspection.  
 
In terms of NCs by ISM module, module 10 represents the highest number of NCs, 
which indicates that ships with NCs related to maintenance issues have taken 
similar deficiencies in the following PSC inspections. It can also be seen that ships 
with NCs related to modules 6, 7, and 8 have similar deficiencies in the following 
PSC inspection. 
 
Table 10 Comparison of similarity and NCs by the ISM module in short term 
Module↘ Number of NCs coded by ISM module 
Similarity 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
No 
 
1 
 
2 1 6 2 3 9 
 
1 25 
Part 
 
1 
 
2 2 3 2 3 10 1 2 26 
Strong 
 
1 
 
1 6 5 8 2 28 
  
51 
N/A
37
 
           
 
Total 
 
3 
 
5 9 14 12 8 47 1 3 102 
(unit: pcs) 
                                       
37
 In the ISM-first group N/A is zero since N/A is the case that of some deficiencies in the PSC 
inspection with no NC in the previous ISM audit (Refer to the Chapter 5) 
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When it comes to the longer period, the NCs with strong similarity decrease 
drastically in nearly every ISM module. With this, apart from whether the ISM Code 
works or not, it is possible to say that, at least, ships with NCs rarely repeat similar 
deficiencies in the following PSC inspection in the long term. In other words, this 
represents indirectly that some dynamic activities were carried out to avoid similar 
nature of deficiencies in the wake of the ISM audit. 
 
Table 11 Comparison of similarity and NCs by the ISM module in long term 
Module↘ Number of NCs coded by ISM module 
Similarity 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
No 
 
2 
 
5 5 7 3 5 10 3 2 42 
Part 
  
1 4 3 5 1 1 15 
 
1 31 
Strong 
     
1 
  
6 1 
 
8 
N/A 
           
 
Total 
 
2 1 9 8 13 4 6 31 4 3 81 
(unit: pcs) 
 
In summary, there was high similarity in the findings between NCs and deficiencies 
in the short term period, particularly in maintenance issues, while the long term data 
showed little similarity. It can be affirmed that the similarity analysis correspond to 
the results of the analysis by the number of findings as the hypothesis expected. 
 
6.1.4 Analysis by the nature of findings 
 
In analyzing the ISM-first group, it was found that the ISM audit has a notable 
impact on the following PSC inspection in the long term, whereas relatively little 
impact was found in the short term. Then next step should be to verify which areas 
of the NCs are effective and ineffective to the following PSC inspection. As 
mentioned in 6.1.3, the findings coded by the ISM module were compared by the 
number of findings and portions.  
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By means of this, the relative importance could be determined along with the 
percentage of findings in the respective events by the ISM module. It is also 
possible to check the variations in nature of deficiencies in the following PSC 
inspection, which reveals which modules were effective, and why the ISM-first group 
made more improvement in the long term. Table 12 and Table 13 illustrate the 
outcome of this analysis in the short term and long term period. 
 
It was found that there were different degrees of variations as time passed. 
Findings noted through Table 12 and Table 13 are as follows; 
 
 Module 9 was the most effective in both timeframes. 
 Modules 5, and 7 showed improvement in both timeframes and were 
notably strengthened with the passage of time 
 Modules 8, and 10 were ineffective particularly as time passed 
 Modules 3, 4, 6, and 12 had positive impacts and remained at a similar level 
regardless of the passage of time 
 
Table 12 Findings by the ISM module in short term 
Module 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
ISM 0/0 3/2.9 0/0 5/4.9 9/8.8 14/13.7 12/11.8 8/7.8 47/46.2 1/1 3/2.9 102/100 
PSC 0/0 0/0 0/0 5/3.7 13/9.4 14/10.2 14/10.2 0/0 86/62.8 5/3.7 0/0 137/100 
Diff.(%) 0 -2.9 0 -1.2 +0.6 -3.5 -1.6 -7.8 +16.6 +2.7 -2.9 - 
(Unit: pcs / %) 
 
In the short term period, the PSC inspection made some improvement in modules 
3, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 12 while in the long term period showed improvement in modules 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 12. More specially, this tells us that the ISM audits primarily impact 
the Master’s responsibility (module 5) and shipboard operations (module 7) as time 
passes. In addition to those modules, but most of the modules showed improvement 
along with the passage of time, supporting the analysis results in 6.1.2.  
 
53 
 
 
Table 13 Findings by the ISM module in long term 
Module 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
ISM 0/0 2/2.5 1/1.2 9/11.1 8/9.9 13/16.0 4/5.0 6/7.4 31/38.3 4/4.9 3/3.7 81/100 
PSC 0/0 0/0 0/0 3/1.9 13/8.1 12/7.5 20/12.4 1/0.5 100/62.1 12/7.5 0/0 161/100 
Diff.(%) 0 -2.5 -1.2 -9.2 -1.8 -8.5 +7.4 -6.9 +23.8 +2.6 -3.7 - 
(Unit: pcs / %) 
 
The ISM audit provided slight effects on company’s responsibility (module 3), 
designated person (DP, module 4), resource and personnel (module 6), and 
company’s verification (module 12). However, it was seen that the ISM audit did not 
have a clear impact on emergency preparedness (module 8), maintenance (module 
10), or documentation (module 11). 
 
Regarding Reporting accident and hazardous occurrence (module 9), it seemingly 
needs to be investigated more despite the fact that it showed the most significant 
improvement in the following PSC inspection. This might be because PSC does not 
look deeply into the management system without clear grounds. And also there 
were only a few deficiencies exhibited in the dataset. Therefore, it is difficult to rely 
on what the figure says and it seems to require more elaboration. 
 
 The picture becomes clearer when the analysis by nature of the findings is applied 
to bad performers. Table 14 and Table 15 indicate the analysis of bad performer 
findings by ISM module. From those tables, it is indicated that; 
 
 Only module 9 showed effectiveness, and module 10 became worse in the 
short term. 
 Most of the modules, except for module 9, were at a similar level in the 
short term. 
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Table 14 Findings (bad performers) by the ISM module in short term 
Module 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
ISM 0/0 1/1.5 0/0 1/1.5 6/8.7 8/11.6 9/13.0 6/8.7 35/50.7 1/1.5 2/2.8 69/100 
PSC 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/2.6 8/10.6 7/9.2 9/11.8 0/0 48/63.2 2/2.6 0/0 76/100 
Diff.(%) 0 -1.5 0 +1.1 +1.9 -2.4 -1.2 -8.7 +12.5 +1.1 -2.8 - 
(Unit: pcs / %) 
 
 Modules 3, 5, 7, 9, and 12 showed good progresses in the long term. 
 Modules 8, and 10 got worse in the long term period. 
 
Table 15 Findings (bad performers) by the ISM module in long term 
Module 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
ISM 0/0 2/3.4 1/1.7 8/13.6 4/6.8 11/18.6 3/5.1 4/6.8 19/32.2 4/6.7 3/5.1 59/100 
PSC 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/7.1 0/0 7/25.0 0/0 17/60.7 2/7.2 0/0 28/100 
Diff.(%) 0 -3.4 -1.7 -13.6 +0.3 -18.6 +19.9 -6.8 +28.5 +0.5 -5.1 - 
(Unit: pcs / %) 
 
Hereupon, it can be said that the ISM audit had a weak impact on the following 
PSC in the short term, except for module 9 in the group of bad performers, and even 
module 10 became worse. There were not many variations in improvement or 
deterioration in the short term. However, intense changes were recorded in the long 
term. This indicates that the ISM audit had a strong positive influence on the overall 
modules in the long term; in particular, there were remarkable improvements in the 
master’s responsibility, and shipboard operation aspects. 
 
6.1.5 Discussions 
 
 As suggested in Chapter 5, it was expected that, if the ISM Code works, a good 
performance would be seen in the PSC inspection if the starting point was a bad 
performance in the ISM audit. A partial or no relationship also should be found 
between the NCs and deficiencies. In order to test the hypothesis, three methods 
were used; compared by the number, similarity analysis, and by the nature of the 
findings.  
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It was consistently observed through those methods that improvement was made 
in the long term period, and more importantly, the bad performers in the long term 
have made a lot of positive progress. Table 16 summarizes the performance 
analysis. The table indicates that irrespective of the performance level in the ISM 
audit, there were not many performance variations at the next PSC inspection in the 
short term period, while the long term showed significant differences. 
 
Table 16 Performances comparisons by the time passage 
Performance  Good performers Bad performers 
Time frame 0~180D 181~365D 0~180D 181~365D 
Maintained or Improved 70.6% 51.4% 25.0% 75.0% 
Similar or worsen 29.4% 48.6% 75.0% 25.0% 
 
In the short term period, performance in the ISM audit maintained the same 
condition in 70~75% of cases. Namely, most of the bad performers in the ISM audit 
stayed in the PSC bad performers group, and ISM good performers remained in the 
good performer's group in the following PSC inspection. This was supported by the 
similarity analysis in Table 9 wherein 10 out of 16 bad performers in the ISM Code 
showed strong similarity, which implies that 62.5% of bad performers repeated 
similar problematic shipboard activities. And the similar performance was also seen 
by the nature of the findings in Table 12 wherein the PSC deficiencies showed 
nearly similar outcomes with the previous ISM audit, except for module 9.  
 
This can occur when the same SMS is applied in the same manner without 
changes, for instance, if the SMS changed in the wrong way, it would create more 
problems. Contrariwise, if the SMS changed in a positive way, the system would 
achieve some improvement. Despite the 25% of improvement in the bad performers, 
and the 29.4% worse performance in the good performers, which are not meaningful 
in general, it could be concluded that the SMS in the short term timeframe is not 
showing dynamic changes by the improvement mechanism of the ISM Code. In 
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other words, the ISM Code is seemingly not working effectively in short term period 
for the ISM-first group. 
 
In contrast, in the long term, only approximately half of the good performers 
maintained their performance level, while 75% of the bad performers made 
improvements in the following PSC inspection. While good performers did not 
maintain their condition as time passed, the bad performers achieved huge 
improvements. Regarding bad performers’ improvement, as demonstrated in Table 
9, only one out of 15 bad performers showed strong similarity with deficiencies in the 
following PSC inspection. This is a sign that the bad performers have worked on 
their vulnerabilities or at least made some positive progress to avoid the same 
deficiencies at subsequent PSC inspections.  
 
Furthermore, it was found that the ISM audit has an impact on the overall safety 
management system. According to Table 13, it was underlined that the ISM audit 
impacted on the PSC inspection in the overall modules other than 8, 10, and 11 and 
the magnitude of the improvement became stronger as time passed. Moreover, bad 
performers presented clear enhanced performances relating to Master’s 
responsibility, and shipboard operations in Table 15, which are impossible to 
progress without systematic approaches. This evidently corresponds to the 
hypothesis. So it might be possible to conclude that the improvement mechanism of 
SMS is functioning in the long term period, which means the ISM Code is working 
properly. 
  
Apart from the conclusion, a question arises as to why the good performers were 
unable to maintain their performances as time passed. This might be explained by 
the limitation of the certification and the capacity of shore-based management. The 
good performers might have a good SMS with well-trained seafarers at the time of 
the audit. However, to maintain the performance, everyone involved in the SMS 
should exert constant efforts to cope with various dynamic, internal and external 
factors such as crew, training, maintenance, and new rules.  
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In practical terms, it is difficult for seafarers and companies to maintain their 
highest attention until the next verification. The same practice is seen in the 
periodical survey. In this regard, the role of shore-based management is paramount 
in maintaining the safety system. It may be inevitable to decline to some extent, but 
the key concern should be how to maintain a high level performance and how often 
the PSC inspection should monitor it. 
 
In contrast, the bad performers gained positive results as time went by. This result 
could be explained by the traits of the ISM audit and improvement mechanism of the 
Code. As seen in Tables 12, and 13, the ISM audit mainly identified findings in the 
procedure-related modules such as modules 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 12. This is because, 
unlike PSCO, the auditor does not focus much on immediate defects; instead 
auditors try to find underlying shortcomings of the system itself and improper 
execution of the SMS through records and interviews.  
 
When looking at improvement areas of the bad performers in Table 15, the bad 
performers in the long term made progress in nearly every module. In particular, 
strong improvement was made in modules 5, and 7, which require a long time to 
take corrective actions. For instance, if NCs in shipboard operations (module 7) 
were identified during the audit, the corrective action should go through the revision 
of the SMS, distributing, training and evaluation processes. Therefore, it can be 
understood that the time-consuming nature of NCs results in fewer effects on the 
improvement mechanism in the short term, which was probably under the process. 
This can be another explanation for why positive effects of the ISM audit are 
revealed in the long term, not in the short term. 
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6.1.6 Summary of analysis of the ISM-first group 
 
 Key findings from analysis in 6.1 are as follows; 
 
In the short term 
 Most of the good performers in the ISM show good performance. 
 The majority of bad performers remain in the bad performance category.  
 
In the long term  
 Good performers in the ISM audits show declined performances.  
 Bad performers make remarkable improvement in many areas of SMS. 
 
We could see that the ISM audit does not provide much impact on the following 
PSC inspection in the short term, which implies that the improvement mechanism 
probably does not work efficiently in that timeframe. In regard to the declining 
performance of the good performer, the significance of the constant shore-based 
attention to and management of the shipboard activities after the ISM audit is 
highlighted.   
  
 Furthermore, it is confirmed that the ISM audit has a positive impact on the 
following PSC inspection in the long term, which implies that positive effects of the 
ISM audit are revealed in the long term. It was also found by evaluating the safety 
management areas coded by the ISM module that there are improvements in many 
aspects compared to the short term period.  
 
This can be attributed to the fact that it requires a certain time to reflect the findings 
into its SMS and internalize the procedures into real shipboard activities, and the 
effect of the improvement mechanism comes after a certain time period. It might be 
possible to say that the ISM Code is working properly in the long term period on the 
grounds of which the improvement mechanism of the SMS works correctly.   
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6.2 Analysis of PSC inspection followed by ISM audit (PSC-first group) 
 
 6.2.1 Overview of PSC-first group 
 
The deficiencies in the PSC inspection and NCs in the following ISM audit of each 
sampled ship (50, 32) were contrasted by number to examine how the PSC 
inspection results impacted the following ISM audit. Table 17 shows that the number 
of deficiencies per ship in the short the term was higher than in the long term, 
whereas the NCs per ship in the following ISM audits showed the same tendency.  
 
Table 17 Total number of Def. and NCs in two timeframes 
Time Def. Def./ship NCs  NCs/ship  
0~180D 155 3.1 133 2.7 
181~365D 92 2.9 74 2.3 
(Unit: pcs) 
 
 
Figure 3 Number of Def./NCs of PSC-first group 
 
6.2.2 Analysis by the number of findings 
 
Table 18 exhibits the number of ships contrasted by the number of deficiencies and 
NCs in the short term period. This table indicates how a particular ship with a certain 
number of deficiencies undertook performances in the following ISM audit. It 
demonstrates the impact of the PSC inspection on the following ISM audit. As in 
155 
92 
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74 
0
50
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200
0~180 D 181~365 D
Def.
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section 6.1.2, whether or not the improvement mechanism of the ISM Code works 
can be measured because PSC deficiencies should be taken as non-conformity with 
the SMS and thereby the ship operators have to take corrective actions. Statistical 
analysis is derived as follows; 
 
 48% of ships (24) had the same or higher number of deficiencies than the 
number of NCs in the following ISM audit. 
 Nine ships had no NC and 52% of ships (26) had good performance in the 
following ISM audit. 
 Among ships with good performance in the PSC inspection (29), 62.1% of 
ships maintained good performance in the ISM audit (18), while 37.9% of 
ships (11) showed the worse performance in the ISM audit.  
 Among ships with bad performance in the PSC inspection (21), 38.1% of 
ships (8) showed improvement in the ISM audit, while 61.9% of ships (13) 
showed similar performance. 
 
Table 18 Number of ships compared by the number of Def. and NCs in short term 
Number 
of Def. 
Number of NCs 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total 
0 2 3 7 1 2 1 1 1 
 
18 
1 3 
  
1 
     
4 
2 1 2 
 
1 2 1 
   
7 
3 
 
1 
  
1 2 1 
  
5 
4 1 
        
1 
5 1 1 
  
1 
 
1 
  
4 
6 1 1 1 2 1 
    
6 
9 
  
1 
 
1 
    
2 
13 
        
1 1 
15 
    
1 
    
1 
16 
   
1 
     
1 
Total 9 8 9 6 9 4 3 1 1 50 
(Unit: ships) 
 
We can see from above that 62.1% of ships among good performers in the PSC 
inspection maintained their good performance in the following ISM audit; while 37.9% 
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of ships showed a worse condition. In the meantime, 38.1% of ships among bad 
performers exhibited improvement, whereas 61.9% showed worse performance. 
 
 The majority of good performers had good performance, which is quite similar to 
the ISM-first group. On the other hand, the bad performers showed approximately 
40% improvements, which might be a signal that the improvement mechanism is 
working to some extent. But still, around 60% of bad performers remained at the 
similar levels. 
 
 Table 19 illustrates the number of ships compared with the number of deficiencies 
and NCs in the long period. It was analyzed as follows; 
 
 59.4% of ships (19) had the same or higher number of deficiencies than the 
number of NCs in the following ISM audit. 
 Six ships had no NC and 62.5% ships (20) showed good performance in the 
following ISM audit. 
 Among ships with good performance in the PSC inspection (20), 65.0% of 
ships maintained good performance in the ISM audit (13), while 35.0% of 
ships showed the same or worse performance (7). 
 Among ships with bad performance in the PSC inspection (12), 58.3% of 
ships showed improvement in the following ISM audit (7), while 41.7% of 
ships showed similar or worse performance (5). 
 
To summarize, 65% of good performers in the PSC inspection showed the same or 
improved performance in the following ISM audit, while 35% showed got worse. In 
the bad performers group, 58.3% of ships showed better performance in the 
following ISM audit, while 41.7% of ships did not. The good performers, in the long 
term, maintained their good performance to a relatively high level which is almost 
similar to the short term, which suggests a point for deliberation, taking into account 
the deterioration of performance as time passes, which is quite reasonable, unlike 
the ISM-first group. Also, it needs to be highlighted that the bad performers 
improved even though the extent of improvement was limited compared to the ISM-
first group.  
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Table 19 Number of ships compared by the number of Def. and NCs in long term 
Number  
of Def 
Number of ships by number of NCs 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 Total 
0 2 2 2 1 1 1 
  
9 
1 1 4 
    
1 
 
6 
2 1 
 
1 1 2 
   
5 
3 
  
1 
     
1 
4 
 
1 
   
2 
  
3 
5 1 
       
1 
6 
 
1 2 
     
3 
8 1 
   
1 
  
1 3 
14 
   
1 
    
1 
Total 6 8 6 3 4 3 1 1 32 
(Unit: ships) 
 
6.2.3 Similarity analysis 
 
 The results of the similarity analysis on the PSC-first group are shown in Table 20, 
indicating how ships responded to the deficiencies identified in the PSC inspection. 
The ships with strong similarity in the short term represented only 14% of all ships, 
which reflects the fair performance of the PSC-first group in the short term period 
compared to the ISM-first group. And also there were only four ships with strong 
similarity in the long term period, which is 12.5%. As such, only a general 
impression is given that the deficiencies do not repeat in the following ISM audit in 
the PSC-first group. But variations on the findings should be investigated more 
thoroughly. 
 
Table 20 Similarity comparison by the timeframe 
Degree No Part Strong N/A Total 
0~180D 14 13 7 16 50 
181~365D 15 6 4 7 32 
(unit: ships) 
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With regard to the comparison of the performance, Table 21 indicates that only one 
bad performer presented strong similarity in the long term, while five ships showed 
strong similarity in the short term. It does not give a clear distinction between the two 
timeframes; however, at least it gives some impression that the deficiencies in the 
PSC-first group do not repeat similar NCs at the next ISM audit regardless of the 
performance level. 
 
Table 21 Similarity by the performance 
 Similarity 
0~180D 181~365D 
Bad Good Total Bad Good Total 
No 5 9 14 6 9 15 
Part 11 2 13 5 1 6 
Strong 5 2 7 1 3 4 
N/A  16 16  7 7 
Total 21 29 50 12 20 32 
(unit: ships) 
 
If the similarity is compared by the nature of the findings, it becomes more 
apparent. Table 22 and Table 23 show the comparison between the similarity and 
deficiencies coded by ISM module. These tables imply that if there are many strong 
similarities, the ships tend to maintain a similar level of performance.  
 
Table 22 illustrates this trend in the short term, for instance, all ships with 46 
deficiencies in the PSC inspection have the strong similarity with the NCs at the 
following ISM audit, which means that ships with around 30% of total deficiencies 
have the strong similarity with the NCs at the following ISM audit. This is different 
results from the ISM-first group, which indicates that the PSC-fist group has fewer 
repetitions of similar findings in the short term compared to the ISM-first group. 
 
In the long term period, the deficiencies with strong similarity decreased further. 
The deficiencies are mostly found in the partial and no relation area. Specifically, 
despite the low number of deficiencies due to the smaller size of the dataset, the 
number of “no similarity” in module 10 is higher than short term period. Hence, the 
table reveals that, at least, ships in the long term did not take many NCs in similar 
areas at the following ISM audit 
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Table 22 Comparison of similarity and Def. by the ISM module in short term 
Module↘ Number of Def. coded by ISM module 
Similarity 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
No 
   
2 3 1 5 
 
18 5 
 
34 
Part 
    
8 6 15 
 
36 10 
 
75 
Strong 
   
1 5 5 5 
 
26 4 
 
46 
N/A            0 
Total 
   
3 16 12 25 
 
80 19 
 
155 
(unit: pcs) 
 
Table 23 Comparison of similarity and Def. by the ISM module in long term 
Module↘ Number of Def. coded by ISM module 
Similarity 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
No 
   
2 3 1 2 
 
36 6 
 
50 
Part 
    
1 5 1 
 
21 5 
 
33 
Strong 
    
1 
   
7 1 
 
9 
N/A            0 
Total 
   
2 5 6 3 
 
64 12 
 
92 
(unit: pcs) 
 
6.2.4 Analysis by the nature of findings 
 
 The deficiencies and NCs were coded by the ISM Code as in 6.1.4, and compared 
with each other by timeframe. The PSC inspection results in each module of the 
SMS can be seen by this analysis. In the ISM-first group, it was found that the ISM 
audit influenced the following PSC inspection in many aspects of the SMS but the 
result was somewhat different in the PSC-first group. The findings can be found in 
Table 24 and Table 25 as follows; 
 
 Modules 8, 10, and 11 showed effectiveness in the short term. 
 Modules 10, and 11 showed effectiveness in the long term. 
 As time passes, the impact on modules 10, and 11 became stronger, while 
positive impact declined in module 8. 
 No clear impact was found in modules 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 12. 
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Table 24 Findings by the ISM module in short term 
Module 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
PSC 0/0 0/0 0/0 3/1.9 16/10.3 12/7.8 25/16.1 0/0 80/51.6 19/12.3 0/0 155/100 
ISM 0/0 7/5.2 0/0 10/7.5 21/15.8 20/15.0 9/6.8 10/7.5 48/36.1 3/2.3 5/3.8 133/100 
Diff.(%) 0 +5.2 0 +5.6 +5.5 +7.2 -9.3 +7.5 -15.5 -10 +3.8 - 
(Unit: pcs / %) 
Table 25 Findings by the ISM module in long term 
Module 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
PSC 0/0 0/0 0/0 2/2.2 5/5.4 6/6.5 3/3.3 0/0 64/69.6 12/13.0 0/0 92/100 
ISM 0/0 4/5.4 0/0 7/9.5 12/16.2 16/21.6 6/8.1 6/8.1 22/29.7 0/0 1/1.4 74/100 
Diff.(%) 0 +5.4 0 +7.3 +10.8 +15.1 +4.8 +8.1 -39.9 -13.0 +1.4 - 
(Unit: pcs / %) 
 
 Based on the analysis, it could be said that PSC inspection has an impact on 
emergency preparedness (module 8), maintenance (module 10), and documentation 
(module 11) which is opposite to the results of 6.1.4. In the ISM-first group, the ISM 
audit did not impact modules 8, 10, or 11; on the other hand, the PSC-first group 
showed the impact only in those modules where the ISM-first group did not have 
effects. This might be a typical relationship between PSC inspection and the ISM 
audit. Among modules positively impacted, PSC primarily impacts on the 
maintenance issue, which is being strengthened as time goes by. It was possible to 
see that the improvement in the maintenance issue contributes to the overall 
reduction in the number of findings. But this outcome might be due to different 
purposes and practices of both regimes. 
 
It was also found that there was not clear impact on the following ISM audit in 
various modules other than modules 8, 10, and 11. There were no deficiencies 
relating to the modules 2, 3, 4, 9 or 12, and the deficiencies relating to module 5, 
remained at around 2% of deficiencies. Considering that the ISM audit influenced 
the PSC inspection in various modules, and it became wider as time passed, the 
PSC inspection has shown considerably different outcomes. Irrespective of the 
variations in the number of findings, this analysis strongly suggests that the PSC 
regime has little impact on the overall safety management system. 
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 To validate the above analysis, the bad performers’ data was analyzed again. 
Table 26 and 27 explain the comparisons of the findings of the bad performers in 
two timeframes. 
 
 Positive impact was witnessed in modules 8, 10, and 11 in the short term. 
 Most of the modules were similar or became worse, particularly modules 7, 
and 9. 
  
Table 26 Findings (bad performers) by the ISM module in short term 
Module 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
PSC 0/0 0/0 0/0 3/2.2 15/10.9 9/6.6 22/16.1 0/0 71/51.8 17/12.4 0/0 137/100 
ISM 0/0 3/4.5 0/0 7/10.6 10/15.2 12/18.2 3/4.6 5/7.6 22/33.3 2/3.0 2/3.0 66/100 
Diff.(%) 0 +4.5 0 +8.4 +4.3 +11.6 -11.5 +7.6 -18.5 -9.4 +3.0 - 
(Unit: pcs / %) 
 
The bad performers in the short term showed precisely similar tendencies with the 
overall condition illustrated in Tables 24, and 25. Only three modules had some 
impact. But some inputs in modules 6, and 7 exist although there was no clear 
impact on the following ISM audit.  
 
 Modules 10, and 11 showed positive impacts in the long term. 
 No impact was found other than modules 10, and 11. 
 The strong impacts were found in module 10.  
 
Table 27 Findings (bad performers) by the ISM module in long term 
Module 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
PSC 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/1.3 4/5.3 5/6.6 2/2.6 0/0 55/72.4 9/11.8 0/0 76/100 
ISM 0/0 2/6.1 0/0 6/18.2 5/15.2 9/27.3 2/6.0 2/6.0 7/21.2 0/0 0/0 33/100 
Diff.(%) 0 +6.1 0 +16.9 +9.9 +20.7 +3.4 +6.0 -51.2 -11.8 0 - 
(Unit: pcs / %) 
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It was confirmed again in the bad performers that there were only positive effects 
on modules 8, 10, and 11 in the short term and module 8 lost impact in the long term. 
The large decrease in the number of NCs in module 10 (maintenance) led to 
improvement in the long term; however, it is unclear whether this is due to limited 
data sampling. Based on the above figure, it becomes more obvious that PSC does 
not have much impact on various aspects of the safety management system, but it 
does have an influence on maintenance and documentation related issues. 
Consequently, it is possible to arrive at the logical conclusion that the performance 
of the PSC-first group and its performance variations were not strongly related to the 
outcome of the improvement mechanism of the ISM Code.  
 
6.2.5 Discussions 
 
Table 28 compares the performance of the PSC-first group in the two time frames. 
This table tells us that the good performers in the PSC inspection maintain a similar 
condition regardless of the timeframe, which is an entirely different result from the 
ISM-first group. Meanwhile, the bad performers make more improvement in the long 
term than in the short term period. 
 
Table 28 Performances comparisons by the time passage 
Performance  Good performers Bad performers 
Time frame 0~180D 181~365D 0~180D 181~365D 
Maintained or Improved 62.1% 65.0% 38.1% 58.3% 
Similar or worsen 37.9% 35.0% 61.9% 41.7% 
 
In the short term period, the good performers and bad performers commonly 
sustained similar condition of around 62%, which is the same pattern shown in the 
ISM-first group. As concluded in 6.1.5, from this similar trend, it can be understood 
that the SMS, particularly the improvement mechanism is not working properly. 
However, more attention needs to be paid to the bad performers’ improvement 
(38.1%) which is higher than the ISM-first group (25.0%).  
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While the NCs in the ISM-first group were mostly associated with findings that 
require a long time to correct, the deficiencies of the PSC-fist group, which 
constitute improvement in the short term, are connected with modules 8, 10, and 11, 
wherein remedial action can be made quickly. The reasonable interpretation is that 
intensified inspection regarding modules 8, 10, and 11 resulted in fewer NCs in 
those areas in the following ISM audit. It is not quite certain that the improvement 
mechanism worked on only those deficiencies, bearing in mind that most of the 
other modules did not give clear impact on the following audit. However, regardless 
of whether those improvements were made through the improvement system or not, 
it carries the strong implication that ships could benefit more immediately from PSC 
inspection than ISM audit in the specific areas mentioned above.  
 
As a reason for immediate effect, the monetary burden should be highlighted. 
Considering that poor maintenance initiates most of PSC detentions, the ship 
owners tend to cope actively with the maintenance issue, which showed the biggest 
improvement in the PSC-first group as shown in Table 26. Once a ship is detained 
in a foreign port, costs will occur not only for the repair but also for market delays. 
The monetary burden and fear for detention could motivate ship owners to react 
more sensitively to the PSC than to the ISM audit. Therefore, it could be inferred 
that the bad performers’ improvement in the short term period seems to be a 
consequence of the police power of PSC, which ultimately affects the safety 
management system of the ship.  
 
 In the long term period, the performance of the good performers maintained a fair 
level, while 58.3% of the bad performers maintained a same condition or made 
improvements. It is a somewhat unexpected outcome that the good performers 
maintained or enhanced their performance in spite of time passage. As discussed in 
6.1.5, the degradation of performance as time lapses after the external stimulus is 
quite normal in reality. Besides, the data gives no clear statistical clues to interpret it. 
The similarity analysis was also not sufficient to provide the cause of the 
improvement as it simply captured an overall view.  
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However, relating to why the PSC-first group does not show degradation of 
performance as time passes, attention should be paid to Table 25 wherein the group 
made much improvement in module 10, where the majority of deficiencies were 
found, in the long term than short term period. This gives some idea when we 
recollect the explanations of the degradations as time passes, which were discussed 
in 6.1.5. The seafarers might keep their level of attention on the maintenance issue 
after the bad memory of PSC inspection. It should be noted that the ship would not 
be able to exactly anticipate the next PSC inspection; however, ship owners can 
somewhat assume the time window for inspection through the targeting system. 
Today, the regional MoUs have global coverage, and their member States share 
inspection records to achieve common goals in their region. This global cooperative 
regime makes the ship ready for inspection in daily operations, unlike periodical 
verification.  
 
 The bad performers in the long term period made notable improvement. But if 
looking inside, as discussed in 6.2.4, PSC does not have much impact on overall 
modules other than modules 10, and 11 where the improvement is mostly 
concentrated. It does not mean that the PSC had ‘zero’ impact on the following ISM 
audit since the deficiencies related to modules 5, 6, and 7 were influential to some 
extent as seen in Tables 24, 25, 26, and 27. But from the statistical point of view, it 
might be a correct expression that PSC does not impact to the safety management 
system in the bad performer group.  
 
Some might say the improvements in modules 10, and 11 were due to the fact that 
PSC always records more deficiencies in module 10 than the ISM audit. This is the 
right point of view because, while auditors tend to look into the crew’s activities with 
a systematic approach, PSCO begins its inspection with the certificates and 
documents and then by checking the overall maintenance condition of the ship. The 
argument that PSC only impacts maintenance and emergency drill or documentation 
and certifications, seems reasonable. However, we need to reconsider the functions 
of the ISM Code. 
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In theory, regardless of the number of deficiencies, if one ship has some 
deficiencies, the improvement mechanism should have been activated to avoid 
similar problems in the future. Therefore, it is premature to say that the PSC 
inspection does not impact the ISM audit considering the improvement mechanism 
of the ISM Code. Nonetheless the fact that the PSC did not identify deficiencies in 
modules 2, 3, 4, 9, or 12 as seen Tables 24, and 25 could be an innate limitation of 
the PSC regime to act as a robust safety net in the shipping industry. Therefore, 
even though bad performers in the PSC-first group showed better performance than 
the ISM-first group and fewer strong similarities were presented, the ISM Code 
might not be working as hypothesized. This might be a reason that its ostensible 
performance was not obtained through the improvement mechanism. However, we 
should highlight the power of the police function of the PSC in the maintenance 
issue. 
 
Taking into account the innate characteristics of both regimes and how the 
improvement mechanism should work, it can be clarified that current PSC 
inspections give some input to the safety management system, but the shipboard 
activity does not make use of it productively. It seems that the deficiencies in the 
PSC inspection have not been processed according to the SMS and it has not been 
monitored properly either. In this point, there must be a cause and effect relationship 
with the fact that there was only one deficiency in module 9 in the datasets used. So 
it comes to the supposition that if the PSCO pays more attention to how the 
deficiencies in the PSC are processed using the improvement mechanism of the 
ISM Code, it might be possible to see more improvements triggered by PSC 
deficiencies instead of being left as just records of the inspections. 
 
6.2.6 Summary of analysis of the PSC-first group 
 
 Key findings from analysis in 6.2 are as follows; 
 
In the short term 
 Good performers in the PSC showed good performance. 
 Bad performers showed more improvement compared to the ISM-first group. 
71 
 
 
In the long term  
 Good performers in the PSC improved their performances. 
 Bad performers primarily made improvement in maintenance. 
 
To recap, the analysis revealed that the PSC inspection has a positive impact on 
the following ISM audit to some extent in the short term, which is mainly due to the 
fear of detention and monetary burdens owing to the PSC inspection. Dissimilar to 
the ISM-first group, the good performers maintained a similar level or better 
regardless of time passage, which might mean that the unscheduled inspection and 
targeting system, contrary to the periodical survey, gives stronger and more 
powerful warnings to the shipping industry.   
  
 Furthermore, it is noted that the positive impact of PSC inspection mostly focused 
on the maintenance issue in the long term, while there were not many impacts on 
the overall safety management system of the ship. Even though few deficiencies 
related to procedural findings were identified in the PSC inspection due to the innate 
trait of the regime, deficiency should have been taken as NCs according to the 
improvement mechanism of the ISM Code. In connection with the hypothesis, the 
PSC-first group showed performances corresponding to the hypothesis, but it did 
not show progress by the nature of the findings. This might be because the 
reduction in the findings did not come from the improvement mechanism. 
 
In this respect, it might be inferred that the improvement mechanism of the SMS 
does not function in response to deficiencies as appropriate, which makes the PSC 
inspection ineffective on the following ISM audit. It was suggested that PSCO should 
pay more attention to how the deficiencies are processed through the SMS 
procedures to prevent recurrence. Consequently, the PSC has little impact on the 
overall safety management system but has a much stronger impact on the limited 
area due to the police function of the PSC. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
The objectives of this dissertation were to examine how the ISM Code impacts the 
PSC inspection, and how the PSC inspection influences the implementation of the 
ISM Code. To achieve these aims, the dissertation focused on the improvement 
mechanism of the ISM Code which should be activated if a ship has any deviation or 
defects during the implementation of the SMS. The continuous improvement 
indicates compliance with the ISM Code, and it would be a strong signal that the 
safety culture has been internalized in the company so that crews actively take part 
in the safety management system (Anderson, 2003; IMO, 2005; Lappalainen & 
Salmi, 2009).  
 
Based on the concept of the improvement mechanism, the hypothesis was 
established. If the bad performers in ISM audit or PSC inspection show good 
performance in the following PSC inspection or ISM audit, with partial or no similarity, 
we could infer that the ISM Code is working properly. Conversely, if the bad 
performers exhibit similar results with strong similarity by the nature of the findings, 
the ISM Code might be working ineffectively because it would be the consequence 
of a malfunction of the improvement mechanism.  
 
This paper used both ISM audit and PSC inspection records of Korean ships from 
the second half of 2013 to 2015, and compiled through tracking the history of 
individual ship records to observe the impact of the previous event on the 
successive event. In addition, the datasets were divided by time intervals (0~180 
days and 181~365 days) between the two events to analyze the variations by 
passage of time, and only ships with no event during those intervals were used in 
the analysis to see immediate influences.  
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 According to the analysis, it was found that, regardless of performance level, ISM 
audit did not noticeably impact the following PSC inspection and the performance 
level remained in a similar condition in the short term. This can occur when the SMS 
is in a static condition without any changes regardless of good or wrong directions. 
So it was concluded that the ISM-first group in the short term had no improvement, 
which might be due to insufficient time to address the NCs because the NCs were 
mostly concentrated in areas which require a systematic approach, safety culture 
and time to complete corrective actions. Nevertheless, this indicates that the 
improvement mechanism of the ISM Code does not have an effect on the safety 
system in this specific timeframe. 
 
Meanwhile, in the long term period, dissimilar to short term results, a very strong 
positive impact of the ISM audit was witnessed in the bad performers on the 
following PSC inspection in all aspects of safety management. Simultaneously, 
some declining performance in the good performers was noticed. It was interpreted 
that the effect of the ISM Code was revealed in the long term since it requires a 
particular timeframe for the NCs to be reflected in the SMS and internalized into the 
procedures of real shipboard operations. In the meantime, degradation of the good 
performers represents the significance of the shore-based management and 
continuous monitoring by PSC. It was found in the ISM-first group that the 
improvement mechanism needs some time to function, and an action to keep the 
good performer in compliance is required.  
 
 In the PSC-first group, the bad performers in the short term period showed more 
improvement than the ISM-first group. But the improvement was mostly 
concentrated in limited areas, such as emergency preparedness, maintenance, and 
documentation, wherein the ISM-first group showed bad performance, while there 
were no improvements in other areas of the safety management system. This paper 
pointed out that the reason for the improvement was that the police power of the 
PSC motivated the ship owner to respond sensitively to the maintenance issues, 
which are the major deficiencies, to avoid detention and subsequent monetary 
burden.  
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In the long term of the PSC-first group, the bad performers exhibited considerable 
improvements, while the good performers showed enhanced performance without 
degradation over the time. In determining data, it was found that there were similar 
tendencies in the short term of PSC-first group whereby only limited areas of the 
SMS were affected. This outcome strengthened the explanation as to the effect of 
the police power of the PSC. Besides, relating to the good performers, it was 
discussed that maintaining a certain level of performance reflected the unexpected 
inspection characteristic of PSC, including the targeting system, which provides 
strong warnings to a shipping company to maintain its ships in fair condition at all 
times. In this regard, it is possible to conclude that the PSC has an impact on the 
following ISM audit directly through its police power. 
 
 Consequently, in a point of effectiveness of the ISM Code, the analysis of the ISM-
first group presented corresponding outcomes to the hypothesis. It denoted that the 
ISM Code has been working although a particular time is required to show the effect 
of the improvement mechanism. Whereas the ISM Code is working partly in PSC-
first group, it would be a more reasonable conclusion that the variations in 
performance are mainly attributed to the police function of the PSC. This is why the 
PSC-first group did not show progress in overall safety management system 
although it corresponded to the hypothesis. 
 
 From the ISM Code and PSC perspective, the ISM Code showed strong features in 
the long term period. It represented apparent improvement effects on the areas 
where the ship had NCs, which could result in the substantial improvement of the 
safety management system. But it would not be easy to expect the immediate 
improvement because certain time to manifest the effect of the improvement 
mechanism is required. On the other hand, PSC inspection indicates clear and 
powerful impact on some part of SMS. The police power of PSC had immediate 
impacts in the short term, which continued over time. On the other hand, it is difficult 
to expect the continuous improvement of safety management systems if it relies 
solely on the police power of PSC. 
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 On the basis of the above, it is possible to conclude that there is a mutual 
complementary relationship between the ISM audit and PSC inspection. So if both 
regimes might be able to complement their weaknesses and utilize each other’s 
merits, the effectiveness of the ISM Code and PSC will be evidently increased. As 
illustrated in Figure 4, PSC inspection has strong features in the short period in 
ensuring the maintenance condition of the vessel, documentation, such as 
certificates, and nautical charts through its police power, while it has shown some 
vulnerability in addressing continuous improvement. In contrast, ISM audit brings 
continuous improvement in the long term because the ISM audit has an effective 
impact on the overall safety management system by means of the improvement 
mechanism, which will cultivate a safety culture. The police power of the PSC, 
therefore, can supplement the weakness of the ISM Code in the short term, and at 
the same time, the continuous improvement under the systematic approach of the 
ISM Code can make the PSC inspection more powerful.  
 
 
Figure 4 Strength and weakness of PSC inspection and ISM audit 
 
On this point, it is worth undertaking further study seeking a way to create synergy 
by utilizing the strengths of both regimes. Moreover, although this paper has limited 
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representativeness of the data, a further study could expand the dataset and applies 
the methodology of this paper and incorporating further variables of the ship, such 
as type, age, and marine accident records. In addition, a qualitative survey might 
provide with more accurate and meaningful outcomes. Furthermore, it seemingly 
necessary in conducting the PSC inspection that PSCO focuses more on the 
continuous improvement function of the ISM Code, such as how the Master’s review, 
incident report and company’s verification, and previous PSC deficiencies were 
processed according to the SMS. Likewise, from the ISM auditors’ point, more 
attention should be paid to whether permanent corrective actions were appropriately 
taken concerning PSC deficiencies.  
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